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Abstract
The curse of natural resources is a well-documented phenomenon in developing coun-
tries: Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly.
Among the transition economies of the former “Eastern Bloc”, a similar pattern can be
observed. In the first years of transition, output fell in all the former communist coun-
tries, but the Central European countries, which are rather poorly endowed with natural
resources, recovered quickly and have enjoyed rather strong economic growth thereafter.
The oil-rich economies of Eastern Europe and Asia have been less successful. This pa-
per shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the transition econo-
mies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling for numerous
other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural resource abun-
dance and economic growth.
Among the transition economies the prime reason for the curse of natural resource is
corruption. The revenues from natural resource abundance induce rent-seeking behav-
iour and corruption across the bureaucracy and the business elite. This increased cor-
ruption slows down economic growth. Other reasons for the curse of natural resources
may be Dutch disease effect and a neglect of education, but the evidence is not very
strong.
These findings stress the importance of fighting corruption, especially in natural re-
source abundant countries. An efficient bureaucracy is a necessary requirement for sus-
tained economic growth. Investment in education is also crucial, but more in the long
run. Economic policies that promote export growth, especially in the manufacturing
sector, may also raise growth.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 1
1 Introduction
1.1 The Topic Of This Paper
The topic of this paper is how the curse of natural resources affected the transition
economies of Eastern Europe and Central Asia during the 1990s, when they were mak-
ing the transition from centrally planned economies to market economies.
The curse of natural resources is a well-documented phenomenon. Numerous studies
have found a significant negative correlation between natural resource abundance and
economic growth. This finding seemed puzzling at first, because classical economic
theory would predict that abundant natural resources should be good for the economy.
After all, natural resources like iron, coal, and oil are used as an input in many in-
dustries. Thus, they are a production factor. One should expect that the abundance of
one production factor should raise the marginal product of other factors, say labour and
capital, and thus contribute to economic growth.
As a matter of fact, economic theory in the 19
th and early 20
th century often regarded
land as an important production factor, and land is a natural resource. In his famous pes-
simistic prediction that economic growth could not be sustained forever, Thomas Mal-
thus argued that since land was a limited resource that does not grow, all other produc-
tion factors would eventually run into diminishing returns, and thus economic growth
would stop.
Thus, a classical economist would conclude that if one country has more natural re-
sources than another otherwise similar country, the former would enjoy higher output
per worker. Unless all countries in the world are in a steady state, this would translate
into higher growth rates in countries that are relatively abundant in natural resources.
Empirical studies have shown that reality contradicted theory: The richest countries to-
day are in general rather poorly endowed with natural resources. Among them are the
Western European countries, whose economies are based on manufacturing and services,
because they have little natural resources. One might argue that Western Europe’s wealth
dates back to the 19
th century, and that the industrial revolution was based on natural re-
sources such as iron and coal, which were abundant in Western Europe at that time.
Habakkuk (1962) argues that it was the relative abundance of natural resources in sparsely
populated North America that enabled the US to overtake the United Kingdom’s position
as economic leader.
However, the stunning success of several Asian economies, notably Japan, South Ko-
rea and Taiwan, has shown that natural resources are not a necessary condition for rapid
and sustained economic growth. None of the Asian tiger economies possesses signifi-
cant natural resource endowments, but their average growth rates during the second half
of the twentieth century have been higher than anywhere else in the world. South Korea
and Taiwan achieved this even under difficult political circumstances.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 2
Among the poor countries of today are countries, especially in Africa, that are richly
endowed with oil, gold, minerals and other natural resources. It seems puzzling that they
have not managed to turn this natural endowment into a revenue-generating mechanism
with which they could achieve sustained economic growth. Especially wealthy oil
countries have not accomplished serious economic progress in the way of creating a
diversified market economy. They are still reliant on their natural resources to a great
extent and do not enjoy sustained growth. Gylfason (2001) mentions that “for OPEC as
a whole, GNP per capita decreased by 1.3 percent per year on average during 1965-
1998”, while the industrial countries enjoyed rather stable positive growth rates, except
during the years of turmoil following the oil crisis and the break-up the Bretton Woods
exchange rate system.
These stylised facts have been supported by empirical analyses. Confronted with
these empirical results, economists have developed theories that can explain the curse of
natural resources. Some have argued that the findings might result from a bias in the
indicator used, but Sachs and Warner (2001) test for possible bias and find that the indi-
cator they use, the share of primary exports in GDP, is unlikely to be biased.
Most economists agree that there must be some sort of crowding out: If natural re-
sources crowd out some activity X, and X is important for growth, then natural re-
sources slow down growth. Plausible candidates for X include education, manufactur-
ing, and sound government policy.
The transition economies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia provide an interesting
case: They began their transition period under similar circumstances around 1990: In all
of them, communist regimes had ruled for decades and were now thrown over and re-
placed by (more or less) democratically elected governments. All of them faced similar
difficulties: They had to make the transition from centrally planned economies to market
economies.
Although the initial conditions were rather similar in these countries, their growth
rates diverged dramatically during the 1990s: Some of them recovered quickly from the
initial shock and have enjoyed positive growth rates for the last few years. Others have
seen their output drop to less than half of the level of 1989 and still have not recovered.
It is possible that these tremendous differences in economic performance can be
partly explained by the curse of natural resources, because natural resource abundance is
one characteristic in which the transition countries differed strongly from the onset on:
Some have oil and ores, some have not.
In this paper, I am going to examine the effect of natural resource abundance on the
growth performance in the transition economies during the 1990s. I will look whether
the curse of natural resource also exists in the transition countries, and how powerful it
is in explaining the variation in growth rates among countries. I will also examine
whether the existing explanations for the Curse also hold in the transition economies.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 3
1.2 The Structure Of This Paper
This paper consists of six sections, divided into several subsections, and an appendix.
In Section 1, I point out what the topic of this paper is, why it is interesting and im-
portant, and how I am going to elaborate on it.
In Section 2, I give an overview of the existing literature on the curse of natural re-
sources in general. Citing from several sources, I provide evidence for the Curse that has
been found in cross-country datasets containing mostly developed and developing
countries.
I also summarise the most plausible explanations for the curse of natural resources
and show that they have been proven to be credible.
In Section 3, I provide a short history of the transition countries. I define explicitly
which countries I regard as transition economies and describe the set of reforms and
stabilisation policies which they have implemented.
In Section 4, the empirical analysis begins. This section is devoted to finding evi-
dence for the curse of natural resources in the transition economies. I introduce two dif-
ferent, but related, indicators for natural resource abundance, and show that they are not
biased. I also show that both indicators are strongly correlated with economic growth,
and this provides first evidence for the Curse.
Next, I test whether this result is robust. Performing a stepwise regression, I intro-
duce a wide range of variables that could plausibly explain growth. I find that the inclu-
sion of other variables does not eliminate the evidence for the curse of natural resources.
In fact, natural resource abundance even appears to be the most important factor ex-
plaining growth.
In Section 5, I try to find out how the Curse works in the transition economies: Does
it lead to higher corruption, lower growth in manufacturing, and lower investment in
human capital? And do these variables in turn affect growth? If so, how large is the ef-
fect?
Section 6 forms the conclusion of this paper and summarises the main points.
In the Appendix, I give detailed information on the data I have used and its sources. I
also provide the key variables I have used for the statistical analyses in this paper.
Thus, Section 2 is basically a summary of the recent literature on the curse of natural
resources. Section 3 is a general introduction to the situation of the transition econo-
mies. Sections 4 and 5 constitute the core of this paper. They are also by far the longest
sections. In these two sections, I use data that I have collected from different sources to
perform an empirical analysis to verify whether the theory of the Curse is supported by
the facts. I then interpret the results, some of which are surprising.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 4
2 The Curse Of Natural Resources
2.1 Empirical Evidence
Since “natural resource abundance” is a somewhat vague concept, there is no unique
measure for it. Some natural resources are not yet discovered; some are discovered but
are not being extracted, maybe due to harsh climatic conditions or environmental con-
cerns. The total stock of natural capital is not easily measured.
Therefore, in estimating the effects of natural resource abundance, one has to use
proxies. The problems are similar to those in human capital theory: Which measures are
available, and which ones do really reflect what is supposed to be measured? In meas-
uring human capital, researchers have to rely on indicators such as average years of
schooling, enrolment ratios, or expenditure on education per capita.
Gylfason (2001) uses the share of natural capital in total capital as a measure of natu-
ral resource abundance. If such data is available, this is probably the “best” measure of
natural resource abundance. But unfortunately, especially in less developed countries,
such data is not easily available.
Sachs and Warner (1995) use the share of natural resource exports in GDP as a
measure of natural resource intensity. The reason is simple: Export statistics are avail-
able for almost all countries, and if the composition of exports is known, the share of
primary goods in total exports can be calculated. Multiplying this share with the share of
exports in GDP yields the share of primary exports in GDP.
This measure can be used because a large endowment of natural resources can be
reasonably expected to result in a high share of primary goods in exports.
Using the share of primary exports in GDP, Sachs and Warner then examine a sam-
ple of 97 developing countries during the time from 1970 to 1989 and find a significant
negative correlation between GDP growth and the ratio of natural resource exports to
GDP. Gylfason (2001) finds a negative relationship between the share of natural capital
in total capital and economic growth. These findings provide evidence for the notion
that a large endowment of natural resources leads to slower economic growth in a coun-
try.
This relationship is stable: Even after controlling for a number of other variables, it
persists. Sala-i-Martin (1997) tests 62 variables that are suspected to explain GDP
growth and finds that the fraction of primary products in exports ranks among the top
twenty of them in terms of robustness.
It does not seem to be very important which measure of natural resource abundance
is used. All of them lead to the same result: Natural resource abundance is associated
with slow economic growth. The fact that different indicators yield the same result
makes the evidence even stronger.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 5
In this paper, I use the share of primary goods in exports, simply because these data
are available for most of the transition economies. I also use the share of primary ex-
ports in GDP to verify the main results.
2.2 Possible Estimation Bias
A possible explanation for the Curse could be that the results were simply biased: If, for
example, some countries were equally endowed with natural resources in 1900, but dif-
fered in some other respect, they would have different growth rates. For example, some
countries might enjoy a favourable geographic situation while others do not.
By 2000, those countries with a favourable geography would be rich, and the others
would be poor. The share of natural resources in GDP would be higher in the poor
countries, although the amount was equal, simply because the total economic size of
these countries would be smaller. We would then find a negative correlation between
economic development and natural resources, and conclude falsely that natural re-
sources had slowed down growth. Hence, the share of natural resources in GDP may be
a biased indicator.
Sachs and Warner (1997) have tested for this possibility. They argue that if there is
an omitted variable like geography, the countries with favourable geography will always
grow faster than others. In this case, the countries that grew fast in the time period con-
sidered (1970-1990 in Sachs and Warner) would have grown fast in the time before that
period, too.
This possibility can be tested by including the average annual growth rate of previous
periods as an additional variable in a regression. Sachs and Warner do so by including
growth in the 1960s. The result is that even when previous growth is controlled for, the
effect of natural resources on growth is still significant. Thus, the notion of bias in the
indicator is rejected.
Sachs and Warner perform an additional test by controlling for geographic charac-
teristics directly. They include variables such as the percent of a country’s land area
within 100 kilometres from the sea, the distance to the nearest major port, the fraction of
the land area in the tropics, and a malaria index. Even with all these variables included,
the effect of natural resources on growth is still significant.
The conclusion is that the curse of natural resources is not a statistical mirage. It is a
fact that during the 20
th century, and especially in the second half of it, natural resource-
abundant economies tended to grow slower than economies with few natural resources.
Sachs and Warner (2001) also mention the argument of some commentators that one
should distinguish natural resources that lead to lots of rent-seeking (minerals, oil etc)
and others that do not (agriculture, fishing). Their conclusion is that the exact definition
of natural resources does not result in any major quantitative changes.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 6
2.3. The Diminishing Importance Of Natural Resources
The Curse used to be particularly puzzling because many economists, including Habak-
kuk (1962), believe that in the 19
th century, it was natural resource abundance which
helped the US to overtake Britain’s position as economic leader. Other countries, such
as Sweden and Australia, were also natural resource abundant in the 19
th century, but
they managed to achieve high and sustained growth to become highly developed and
wealthy industrial economies, so obviously they did not fall prey to the curse of natural
resources.
This is not a logical contradiction, because in some crucial respects the world in the
20
th century was different. Easy access to coal may have been a great advantage in the
19
th century, but this holds no longer true in today’s global economy. Transport costs
have decreased dramatically, economic borders have been broken down, and energy of
all sorts is available to everyone. Domestic natural resources are no longer a great ad-
vantage when foreign ones  can easily be imported.
The introduction of renewable energies may continue this development, because it
decreases the dependence on fossil energy resources even more.
This argument is quite plausible, but it explains only part of the story: Even if do-
mestic sources of natural resources today are no longer important, this means only that
they do no longer drive growth. There is still no reason to assume that they actually slow
down growth.
Furthermore, as Sachs and Warner (2001) point out, neither the US nor Australia or
Sweden ever achieved the high ratios of primary exports to GDP as the Gulf States do
today. They were natural resource abundant around 1900 by the standards of that time,
but not by today’s standards. Their natural resource sectors never became too dominant,
and this may be the reason why they were spared by the curse of natural resources.
2.4 Crowding-Out Of Manufacturing Exports
Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that the curse of natural resources must lie in the fact
that natural resources tend to crowd out some activity X, which is crucial to economic
growth. In their view, activity X is likely to be manufacturing.
They explain how crowding-out of traded-manufacturing industries by a dominant
natural resource sector can permanently depress economic growth: The benefits from
the natural resource sector accrue to a part of the population that has no incentive to
invest them productively. Instead, the export revenues are spent in such a way that the
demand raises the prices of non-tradable goods and services, and especially wages.
Since the manufacturing sector uses non-tradables and domestic labour as inputs for
production, it cannot be competitive on the world market.
In countries with few natural resources, by contrast, the manufacturing sector re-
ceives a larger share of the total export revenue. Since manufacturing is usually a com-The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 7
petitive industry, the money is spent efficiently: It is invested in new capital and new
technologies. This raises the productivity of labour. Output grows, wages rise, and
capital owners earn a fair return on their investment. There may also be technological
progress due to learning-by-doing. If this mechanism does not work, there is no growth
throughout the whole economy.
In other words, manufacturing exhibits a positive externality to the economy, as
Sachs and Warner (1995) already point out. The problem is that the producers of manu-
factures do not capture the whole benefits from their activities. All they see is that due
to high input prices, their competitiveness is low, and they close down their businesses.
As a result, the positive externalities, which would accrue to the country as a whole, are
lost.
If this hypothesis is to be tested with empirical observations, the test requires some
measure for the relative price of tradable goods. Unfortunately, such a measure is not
directly available. Sachs and Warner (2001) solve this problem by calculating the ratio
of a country’s purchasing power parity exchange rate to its nominal exchange rate.
This procedure should result in an unbiased estimator, because the price of tradables
is more or less equal everywhere, so the general price level can be used as an indicator.
It is a weighted average of the prices of tradables and non-tradables.
Sachs and Warner (2001) then perform a test on the difference in price levels. They
control for the fact that in more developed countries, the price level is generally higher
than in less-developed ones. As a result, they find that there is indeed a positive rela-
tionship between natural resource abundance and the general price level. So far, the ex-
planation is credible.
The question then is whether the higher price level really impedes export growth. Un-
fortunately, Sachs and Warner do not provide a test whether high price levels are really
negatively correlated with export growth. Although one should expect that competitive-
ness suffers under high price levels, which would lead to lower export growth, it would
be interesting to know the significance and the size of this relationship.
However, they do show that the contribution of the growth of manufacturing exports
to overall economic growth was smaller in natural resource abundant countries. They
derive a proxy for this contribution by multiplying the growth in value added from
manufacturing exports over the whole time period times the share of manufacturing ex-
ports in GDP in the starting year. This proxy, they say, is negatively correlated with
natural resource abundance.
In addition to the rise in the general price level, natural resource abundance may also
increase exchange rate volatility. Many countries are richly endowed with only one or
two specific natural commodities. They are not sufficiently diversified, so that a shock
in demand for their main export goods can have huge impacts on their exchange rate.
Exchange rate volatility obviously provides another impediment to the growth of manu-
facturing exports.
Thus, the Dutch disease hypothesis appears to be credible: Export revenues from
natural resources are spent on non-traded goods. Therefore, the prices of these goods are
higher in a natural resource abundant country than in an otherwise similar country. SinceOsteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 8
the manufacturing sector uses non-tradable goods as inputs, it is not competitive on the
world market. Exports of manufacturing grow more slowly than otherwise, and the
manufacturing sector in general will grow more slowly because it also faces foreign
competition in the domestic market. The crippling of the manufacturing sector slows
down overall economic growth, partly because the positive externalities from manufac-
turing in the form of faster technological progress are lost.
2.5 Crowding-Out Of Investment In Human Capital
A similar reasoning of crowding out can be applied for investment in human capital. If
high wages make manufacturing unprofitable, they also reduce the attractiveness of in-
vesting in education.
Gylfason (2001) argues that it is not the existence of natural resources per se that im-
poses a drag on growth, but rather the way governments deal with the issue. Using pub-
lic expenditure on education as indicator, Gylfason finds a statistically significant rela-
tionship between natural resource abundance and low levels of educational effort.
Counter-examples include Botswana and Norway. Other indicators also show a negative
correlation between natural resource abundance and educational effort.
As a next step, Gylfason argues that education is important for economic growth. He
finds clearly positive, but decreasing, returns to education. A positive relationship be-
tween secondary school enrolment and economic growth is found significant. Gylfason
concludes that about half of the natural resource curse works through the education
channel.
Against this, Temple (2001) argues that the effect of education on growth is not as
strong as many believe.
From a theoretical point of view, it makes perfect sense to expect that education has
an impact on growth. First of all, human capital is a production factor just like physical
capital. Therefore, investment in human capital is the same as investment in physical
capital. Even the simple Solow model predicts that as long as a country is below its
steady state, a higher savings rate will lead to faster growth, and most countries are not
in their steady state in reality. An extended Solow model with both human and physical
capital can explain a large part of the variation in growth rates that we observe among
countries: There is conditional convergence because each country is converging towards
its unique steady state, and hardly any country can be said to be in a steady state.
Furthermore, in endogenous growth theory, the level of human capital can have a
huge impact not only on short-run growth but also on growth in the long run. If the
speed of technological progress depends on the level of the human capital stock, and
this is a perfectly plausible assumption, then the long-run growth rate of the economy
also depends on the level of the human capital stock. The size of the effect of invest-
ment in human capital depends on the specification of the model and on the size of the
parameters: If the stock of knowledge helps in gaining additional knowledge, andThe curse of natural resources in the transition economies 9
knowledge is produced by human capital, there may be increasing returns to human
capital. In this case, the benefits from investing in education can be enormous.
On the other hand, additional knowledge may become more and more difficult to ac-
quire once a high stock of knowledge exists. Then there could be decreasing returns to
human capital, so the benefits from education are rather small.
To sum up, there are good arguments, both theoretical and empirical, that neglect of
investment in human capital may be one of the explanations for the curse of natural re-
sources. It is unclear, however, how large this effect can be in reality.
2.6 Rent-Seeking And Corruption
The availability of natural resources tends to lead to massive rent-seeking in the gov-
ernment and the elite. Rent-seeking may take the form of tariff protection or outright
corruption. This in turn leads to massive distortions of the economy and slows down
growth.
Natural resource abundance may also create a false sense of security in the people, as
pointed out by Auty (2001). Necessary (and possibly painful) reforms of the labour mar-
ket and other sectors are delayed because the country can survive on natural resource
exports alone.
Corruption always goes hand in hand with rents, because pressure groups may block
political reforms in order to protect their rents. If there are no rents to be protected or
captured, there is no need for corruption.
Why should rent-seeking behaviour be more common in countries where natural re-
sources are abundant? Because the extraction of natural resources is usually controlled
by huge corporations or state authorities. Natural resources are not produced in a com-
petitive market environment. There are, so to say, huge barriers to entry. In contrast to
manufacturing or services, it is simply not possible for private investors to start up a
natural resource extraction company. The companies that exist often hold a monopoly
position or are part of a cartel. Because of the need for acquiring mining concessions,
there are close ties between the state authorities and the companies.
Natural resources are often found in areas which are not easily accessible and rather
thinly populated. In contrast to manufacturing and service industries, which are typically
situated in populated areas, natural resource production has to take place where the re-
sources are, and these are often in unfriendly regions. The rule of law is not very strong
in these areas.
In the case of Russia, the communist regime in some cases constructed whole cities
just to provide housing for the workers in natural resource extraction. In such regions,
the local natural resource producer has a monopsony position in the labour market, be-
cause there is no other employer in the region. This puts workers into a dependent posi-
tion. Company managers then have considerable leeway to do whatever they want. This
makes them extremely vulnerable to bribery and other forms of illegal behaviour.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 10
The question is how corruption influences the growth rate of the economy. Some
economists have seriously and plausibly argued that corruption may actually increase
efficiency and welfare. In the presence of other distortions, corruption and black market
activity may be a second-best solution to the original distortions. If the state bureaucracy
is weakly developed, bribes and speed money may actually improve the efficiency of the
bureaucracy because they are used to “buy” decisions that are beneficial and urgent for
someone who might otherwise have to wait for years.
One has to keep in mind, however, that a second-best solution is worse than a first-
best solution, and that the first-best solution would be to install the appropriate legisla-
tion, a powerful jurisdiction, and an efficient bureaucracy.
Corruption can create huge distortions in an economy. Since a bribe payment has to
be kept secret, both bribers and bribees have to find ways to cover up the deal. Corrupt
government officials and businessmen spend time and effort on hiding their activities.
They could use the same time and effort to work productively.
Another point is that bribe payments are usually not used in efficient ways. A corrupt
official cannot take his bribe receipts to the capital market and use them to finance prof-
itable investments, because others may ask questions where he got the money from.
Bribe payments are hidden in safes and foreign bank accounts, where they are of no use
for the domestic economy.
Bardhan (1997) says that “corruption has its adverse effects not only on static effi-
ciency, but also on investment and growth.” If bribes have to be paid in order to receive
a permission to start a new business, this clearly reduces the incentive to invest. Coun-
tries with efficient bureaucracies collect fees and taxes, but they are set up in such a way
that they do not (at least in theory) depress economic growth. Investments leading to
negative profits in the short run are tax-deductible, but bribes are not.
Thus, according to Bardhan, the negative effect of corruption on growth results
mainly from a disincentive to invest. Corruption leads to low investment, and this in
turn leads to slower growth.
Bardhan also argues that corruption does not only reduce the amount of investment,
but also the composition of it. Even if the amount of investment is unchanged, it be-
comes less productive, because it is diverted into inefficient areas. If corrupt govern-
ment officials divert the cement from road and bridge building to build their own palace,
this cement still enters the national accounts as investment, but it will probably not con-
tribute to economic growth.
A final point made by Bardhan is that entrepreneurship is discouraged by corruption.
If it is frustrating to start a new business because there is a lot of red tape and bribe-
paying involved, potential innovators may decide not to open their own business and
work somewhere else.
Bardhan supports his theoretical considerations by citing evidence from Paolo Mauro
(1995), who found a significant negative association between a corruption index and the
investment rate in a sample of 70 countries.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 11
Thus, there are good reasons to believe that natural resource abundance, by concen-
trating wealth and power in the hands of a small elite, fosters corruption and rent-
seeking behaviour. This in turn depresses economic growth, because the incentive to
invest is reduced, and the remaining investment is not used efficiently.
2.7 The Predatory State
Auty (2001) delivers an interesting framework for explaining the curse of natural re-
sources in which he actually combines the effects mentioned above. He argues that the
dominance of a natural resource sector leads to conditions which give rise to a predatory
state structure, where a powerful elite controls the revenues from the natural resource
exports.
To the conventional four necessary conditions for sustained growth
–  relatively equitable access to land and primary education
–  effective markets and public accountability
–  open trade policy
–  competitive economic diversification to give resilience to shocks he adds a fifth one:
a developmental state
Auty defines the developmental state as “a state that is concerned about long-run so-
cial welfare and equity and aims to improve in this respects”.
He contrasts two political models, the competitive industrialisation model and the
staple trap model, against each other. Natural resource-rich countries are well described
by the staple trap model, whereas successful economies like South Korea are a prime
example for the competitive industrialisation model.
In the competitive industrialisation model, a virtuous economic circle and a virtuous
social circle work together to create sustained growth. Key features are that the lack of
natural resources forces the economy from the onset on to diversify into labour-intensive
(light) industry. This creates a labour shortage, and this in turn leads to social equity
(because everyone has a job), accelerated demographic development (urbanisation,
slower population growth, more workers per dependent), increasing skills and education
(I don’t see why better education follows) and so on. The social development creates a
homogenous working population, and this facilitates the development of social capital
and democratic structures. There is little rent-seeking and corruption.
In the staple trap model, the root of all evil is natural resource abundance. The natural
resource export sector provides jobs for unskilled workers. Therefore, there is little in-
centive for individuals to invest in education. At the same time, a powerful elite evolves
around the natural resource sector. Among the elite, rent-seeking and corruption are
widespread. The export revenues are not invested in useful projects, but wasted by the
elite. A manufacturing sector will hardly develop because it cannot compete internation-
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further rents and distortions. It does not contribute to job creation because it is usually
capital-intensive. And the protected industry will never become viable and continues to
be supported by the state, which is another waste of money.
All these flaws lead to worsening income inequality and slow accumulation of human
and social capital.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 13
3 The Transition Economies
In this paper, I concentrate on the transition economies of the former Eastern Bloc under
the dominance of the Soviet Union. Other countries, such as China, Mongolia, Vietnam,
and Cuba, are also classified as transition economies by many commentators, and rightly
so. After 1989, and in some cases even years before, virtually all communist States began
the transition from a planned economy to a more or less free market economy.
However, I am mostly interested in the developments in the transition economies of
Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. They have been economically closely in-
tertwined through their membership in the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance
(COMECON) and their geographical situation. They all began their transition at roughly
the same time, although some Central European countries had experimented with mar-
ket reforms years before the “transition period” began.
Therefore, my group of “transition economies” consists of the former member States
of the Soviet Union and the former communist countries of Europe. Mongolia, China,
Cuba, and Vietnam are not part of this group.
TABLE 3.1
The Three Groups of Transition Economies
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Table 3.1 shows a listing of the countries that I consider as “transition economies”. In
most analyses, there are three groups of transition economies:
The CEE States are those countries which belonged to the Soviet sphere of influence,
but were never absorbed into the Soviet Union. Most of them have been independent
States since the end of World War I or longer, but some gained their independence only
in the last decade.
The Baltic States were absorbed by the Soviet Union during World War II. They de-
clared themselves independent and were recognised as independent in 1991. They are
not members of the CIS, and have oriented themselves in economic and political terms
strongly towards the Western World. All of them are expected to join the European
Union at some time in the near future. Lithuania may even belong to the first wave of
EU ascendants together with countries like Poland and Hungary.
The Community of Independent States was formed after the break-up of the Soviet
Union. Almost all of the Soviet Union’s successor States, with the exception of the Bal-
tic States, are now members of the CIS.
3.1 The Collapse of Communism
Although the collapse of the communist system had been predicted by economists, soci-
ologists, and many others a long time ago, observers in the West were nevertheless sur-
prised by the developments that took place between 1989 and 1991. In a period of
roughly two years, the once-powerful Soviet Empire along with its satellites collapsed.
Communist governments were overthrown all over Europe and the Soviet Union. The
latter was formally dissolved in December 1991. The “Eastern Bloc” did no longer exist.
The ultimate reason for the fall of communist governments was the dissatisfaction of
a huge majority of the people with their economic situation and the lack of civil liber-
ties. The economic situation of the communist countries had deteriorated seriously since
around 1970. The lag of the communist countries towards the Western capitalist coun-
tries had become all too obvious:
–  Since 1970, the COMECON member states had experienced declining growth rates.
During the 1980s, growth even turned negative in most of these countries.
–  The productivity of both labour and capital was low compared to Western standards.
–  There was slow technological progress. In the West, the rapid development of the IT
industries created visible benefits for everyone, and the technology gap between
West and East became increasingly apparent.
–  What growth there was, was consumed by military expenditures. In order to compete
with the US in terms of military power, especially the USSR spent an ever increas-
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–  Especially in the USSR, the agricultural sector was still as inefficient as ever.
COMECON as a whole was not self-sufficient and had to import food from the
West.
–  Standards of living were mediocre at best, compared with the West. Especially in
the GDR, people knew this from watching West German TV programmes.
All this was of course not new. The economic superiority of the West and the politi-
cal oppression in the East had existed for several decades. There had been uprisings and
liberation movements before, in 1953 in East Germany, 1956 in Hungary, 1968 in
Czechoslovakia, and in the early 1980s in Poland. The crucial difference in 1989 was
that under Gorbachev the Soviet Union did not send its army to crush the opposition
movements. Without the help of the Red Army, communist governments in Central and
Eastern Europe saw no chance of staying in power, and many refrained from shooting
their own people.
The reason why the Red Army did not intervene in 1989 was not purely Gorbachev’s
humanity, although this may be part of the reason. The economic situation in the USSR
had deteriorated so badly that the party leadership decided to concentrate on domestic
problems instead of over-stretching its capacities by meddling with the affairs of other
states. Thus, the countries of Eastern and Central Europe had relatively few problems in
gaining independence from the Soviet Union.
Along with the political changes, it was clear that there would also be a reorientation
of the economic system from a planned economy to a market economy. In most of the
former communist states, the new democratically elected governments immediately took
measures to start the transition towards a market economy. Exceptions are Yugoslavia
and the Soviet Union, which first had to be disbanded (in the case of Yugoslavia, this
happened amidst a violent civil war) before their former member states could initiate the
transition.
The disintegration of the Soviet Union occurred relatively peacefully. The Baltic
states were the first to declare independence. Then, in December 1991, the Soviet Union
was formally dissolved. Its former member states, excluding the Baltic states and Geor-
gia, formed the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which Georgia joined in
1993. The CIS, despite its name, was not a commonwealth but rather a loose economic
co-operation agreement.
In Yugoslavia, people were not as lucky. Independence movements, first arising in
Slovenia and Croatia, were fought by the Yugoslav (Serbian) army, and this led to a
bloody civil war. Slovenia and Croatia were recognised as independent states by the
international community in 1992. Later on, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
also gained independence.
The chaotic developments in former Yugoslavia disrupted the economies of its mem-
ber states to differing degrees. In Bosnia and Serbia, the situation was so chaotic that
economic data are not available for a large part of the 1990s. These two states are there-
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Another federal state that was dissolved as a result of the transition was Czechoslo-
vakia. The Czech and Slovak Republics, however, split peacefully and maintain friendly
relations and close economic ties, even in the form of a monetary union.
3.2 Structural Reforms and Macroeconomic Stabilisation
Once the governments of Central and Eastern Europe had decided to transform their
economies into market-based ones, Western experts and advisors rushed in to tell them
how to achieve this. Heated debates about the most efficient way towards a market
economy arose. In the beginning of transition, there was a big argument about the speed
of transition: Should governments try the “big bang” approach by doing all the neces-
sary steps at once, giving the economy a cold shower? Or should they be more careful
and pursue a “go-slow” strategy of implementing one reform after the other so that the
economy could adjust gradually?
The GDR took the most radical approach: Within less than one year after the fall of
the wall, full economic and political integration with the Federal Republic of Germany
was established. Thus, there was no real transition; it was more like a shock therapy.
The remaining transition countries could not follow this example; they had to find ways
to reform and stabilise their own economies.
Despite the confusion and the differing opinions about the “best” transition strategy,
all countries followed astonishingly similar strategies: In all countries, the set of reforms
to be implemented was more or less the same, although the speed and sequencing of the
reform process differed.
The creation of a market economy required far-reaching structural reforms:
–  the privatisation of enterprises, which were state-owned
–  a reform of the banking and financial sector, which was practically non-existent in
most countries
–  the setting up of a tax system and tax authorities
–  the setting up of a social safety net
–  an industrial policy aimed at restructuring enterprises that were fit to survive and
shutting down the others
In order to cushion the effects of these reforms, government also applied a set of
macroeconomic stabilisation policies:
–  price liberalisation, because price were distorted by massive subsidies
–  balancing the government budget
–  a restrictive monetary policy to prevent excessive inflation
–  liberalisation of foreign trade and restoring the convertibility of the currencies
The debate of big bang versus gradualism was settled some years later when econo-
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rather the sequencing of the reforms. In this respect, the transition economies differed
considerably, especially in the privatisation and the reforms of the banking sector and
the tax system.
Some countries, notably Czechoslovakia and Russia, put heavy emphasis on their
mass privatisation programmes. In the case of Czechoslovakia, and later the Czech Re-
public, this had mainly political reasons: The democratic government wanted to make
the reforms irreversible. It feared that due to political instability, it would have little
time, so it wanted to push through as many reforms as possible within its term in office.
Thus, a huge number of companies were privatised in two waves. The first wave was
completed in 1992, and after the split-up of Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic com-
pleted a second wave of mass privatisation in 1994, which Slovakia did not. In both
waves, citizens were granted a certain number of points which they could bid for shares
in the companies to be privatised. The creators of this programme believed strongly in
the working of markets; the markets would ensure that prices would reflect market val-
ues of the shares, and so each citizen would earn a fair share.
The problem was that citizens had no clue which shares to bid for: Out of nowhere,
hundreds of stocks had appeared on the Prague stock exchange where before there had
been none. The average citizen, having little knowledge about how a market economy
actually works, could not make reasonable buying decisions. As a logical consequence,
most of them entrusted their points to the newly created investment funds, which were
blossoming everywhere.
These investment funds turned out to be bad investments: Almost none of the fund
managers possessed the necessary skills and knowledge to manage such a fund, and
some were criminals who took the money and left for the Caribbean. They exploited the
companies via so-called “tunnelling” techniques. Corruption became widespread, people
lost their investments, and economic growth was disappointingly slow.
In 1997, the Czech economy got into serious trouble because of a banking crisis:
Since a banking sector reform had not been undertaken, banks were still state-owned.
As such, they had no incentive to maximise profits and made no sensible lending deci-
sions: they just kept lending, even to non-viable companies. In 1997, they had accumu-
lated a huge amount of bad debts, and severe bank failures threatened. The government
had to bail out the indebted banks to prevent more damage to the economy, but this was
expensive and drove up public debt. Since 1997, the Czech economy has recovered.
Growth is now positive and rather stable, and living standards are rising.
In Russia, mass privatisation took a different shape: enterprises were encouraged to
apply for being privatised. In order to make privatisation attractive, the workers of the
enterprise were offered schemes that guaranteed them a majority stake in enterprise. The
government, on average, retained another 20% of each company’s shares. Thus, less
than 30% of shares were on average auctioned.
This scheme led to a large degree of insider ownership in Russian companies. The
idea was that insiders (workers and managers) would have the appropriate incentive to
make a company profitable, so that principal-agent conflicts would not arise. In reality,
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themselves, and not in the interest of their companies. Companies that were absolutely
incompetitive and should have been closed immediately were kept afloat by asset scrap-
ping and lobbying for subsidies, because workers wanted to keep their jobs.
Especially in the outlying regions of Russia, where the rule of law was even weaker
than in Moscow, crime and corruption bloomed. In many companies, managers put
pressure on workers to sell them their shares at ridiculous prices, so that they could
themselves gain a majority stake. These manager-owners were then free to do whatever
they wanted. Since there was no central authority to register shareholders, companies
themselves recorded share transactions and kept these information secret in safes. This
provided another opportunity for owner-managers to cheat on owners of minority stakes.
As a result, the initial fall in output in Russia was longer and more pronounced than
in other transition economies. Corruption and the lack of financial markets, which could
have acted as a disciplining mechanism, led to an inefficient allocation of resources.
Economic growth stayed negative until 1998, when reforms and a strengthening of the
rule of law finally showed some beneficial effects.
The Czech Republic and Russia are often cited as prime examples of an unsuccessful
mass privatisation programme. There were also more successful programmes: Hungary
and Poland, in particular, were very successful in privatising their state-owned enter-
prises, although they followed fundamentally different approaches.
In Hungary, there was no mass privatisation. Enterprise ownership was not distrib-
uted for free; the enterprises were sold to investors who could pay for them. Foreign
investors played a crucial role in the privatisation of banks and enterprises. Hungarians
believed that investors from the capitalist countries, bringing in economic knowledge
and management skills, could be a great help in the restructuring of these enterprises. As
an additional benefit, foreign investors had to buy the enterprises from the government,
so that much-needed cash came in. Hungary was one of the countries with the highest
foreign debt, so a little government revenue was desirable.
The Hungarian programme had the intended effects: Foreign investors came rushing
in. Between 1990 and 1992, foreign investment made up 75 percent of the total revenue
from privatisation of state-owned enterprises.
Of course, foreign investment also has some drawbacks. By 1994, 31 percent of the
nominal capital of companies was owned by foreigners. This can have adverse effects:
Crises from abroad may quickly spill over, and parts of the population may openly op-
pose foreign ownership of domestic companies.
These drawbacks are the reason why Poland restricted foreign investment. Instead,
Poland also implemented a mass privatisation programme, but with considerably more
success than Russia and the Czech Republic. The crucial difference was that in Poland,
the programme started relatively late, when institutions and laws were already installed
that prevented the massive degree of corruption seen in other countries. Instead of al-
lowing any dubious figure to manage an investment fund, the Polish government set up
15 National Investment Funds (NIFs) that were managed (but not owned) by foreign or
domestic fund managers. The shares of state-owned enterprises were distributed among
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The ownership structure of the enterprises was arranged in such a way that in each en-
terprise, there was a “leading fund”, an investment fund that owned 33 percent of shares
and thus had an incentive to enforce shareholders’ interests. As a result, there has been
little corruption in Poland. Uncompetitive enterprises were shut down (as shareholders
value was thus maximised), and viable enterprises were restructured.
The lesson to draw from these examples is that privatisation without a strong rule of
law and proper supervisory institutions, as it happened in Russia and the Czech Repub-
lic, leads to chaos and corruption. Only when proper institutions are in place to guaran-
tee that law is respected, privatisation is successful.
With respect to macroeconomic stabilisation, most countries have been rather suc-
cessful. All countries experienced a period of very high inflation at the beginning of
transition, and some were even struck by hyperinflation, but by the mid-1990s, inflation
rates in all countries had stabilised at moderate to high levels except in Bulgaria, which
ran into hyperinflation again in 1996-97. Inflation in the transition economies remains
well above the Western European average, but within acceptable limits. The CEE-5
even managed to bring inflation down below 10 percent.
The initial surge in prices could have been expected: There was monetary overhang,
and at the artificially low administered prices there was excess demand for most goods.
Naturally, as prices became liberalised, this excess demand drove up prices to their
equilibrium level. Once the equilibrium prices were reached, the shortages and queues
so typical for communist countries had disappeared.
Furthermore, most transition countries had severely undervalued their currencies.
This undervaluation had the beneficial effect of raising exports, especially to Western
Europe, but it also fuelled inflation. Hordes of Western tourists came to Eastern Europe
because even luxury goods were extremely cheap compared with Western standards,
and with their spending they drove up prices.
Naturally, in those countries that had not immediately implemented a banking reform
and set up an independent central bank, governments used the printing press to balance
their budgets, and again drove up inflation. This was the cause of hyperinflation in Bul-
garia in 1996 and 1997.
Balancing the government budget proved difficult in most countries: The drop in
GDP, which was in general stronger than expected, reduced tax revenue and increased
the need for social safety spending. Furthermore, tax evasion became widespread. The
former communist bureaucracies had little experience in detecting tax evasion, and there
were loopholes in the tax systems. This explains why huge companies like the Russian
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3.3 The Difference in Outcomes
To sum up, it is not easy to say why some countries were much more successful than
others. All of them followed more or less the same set of policies, but the results are as
different as they can be: In the most successful countries, like Poland or Slovenia, out-
put fell by about 20 percent and then grew at rates of around 3 percent. Today, real GDP
per capita in the CEE-5 countries is higher than it was in 1989.
In contrast, the more unsuccessful countries went into economic depression for more
than half of the 1990s. In Russia, real GDP fell to a little more than half of its level in
1989. Other countries, like Georgia, performed even worse: By 1994, Georgia’s GDP
had fallen to less than one quarter of its pre-transition level.
There is no unique explanation for these differences in growth performance. Even the
outcome of the Czech mass privatisation programme, which can only be called disas-
trous, did not prevent the Czech Republic from being among the top performers among
the group of transition economies, although behind Poland, Hungary, and Slovenia.
Some authors argue that openness to trade, especially with Western Europe, eased the
transition process considerably. This may be true, but it explains only part of the story:
Romania and Bulgaria have been very open to international trade. Romania, for exam-
ple, has been member of the IMF and GATT since the early 1970s, but it performed
considerably worse than Slovenia, which is not a GATT member and joined the IMF as
late as 1993.
One respect in which the transition countries differed considerably is the abundance
of natural resources. Some countries, especially the Central European ones, have few
natural resources within their borders. In this respect, they are similar to their neighbour
countries Germany, Austria, and Italy, which are also poorly endowed with natural re-
sources. As a consequence, these countries export mostly industrial manufactured
goods.
Other countries are relatively richly endowed with natural resources. Russia is one of
world’s greatest oil exporters, and it has coal, gold, and other mines. Kazakhstan has
also oil and coal. Naturally, in these countries primary goods make up a large share of
total exports.
This difference in natural resource abundance may be one of the factors explaining
the difference in outcomes. It is a stylised fact that the Central European countries,
which have few natural resources, performed relatively well after 1990. The Asian tran-
sition economies, which are on average richly endowed with natural resources, per-
formed relatively poorly.
These observations may indicate that the curse of natural resources could be one
powerful factor influencing growth in the transition economies. In the next section, I
will examine whether there is evidence for the curse of natural resources in the transi-
tion economies, and how large the impact of the Curse is likely to be.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 21
4 Evidence For The Curse
In this section, I examine the relationship between natural resource abundance and
growth and find that they are negatively correlated. As a proxy for natural resource
abundance, I decide to use the share of primary goods in total exports (ShaPrimEx). I
perform a test for possible bias in this proxy and find no evidence for bias.
In order to test for the robustness of the negative association between natural resource
abundance and growth, I perform a stepwise regression: I include a wide range of plau-
sible explanatory variables and eliminate one by one the least significant ones. It turns
out that natural resource abundance is one of the most significant factors influencing
growth in the transition economies.
4.1 The relationship between natural resource abundance and growth
In order to estimate the extent of the natural resource abundance of a country, I have two
different (but related) indicators:
An obvious indicator is the share of primary goods in exports (ShaPrimEx). Primary
goods are defined as agriculture, fuels, and ores and metal. These data are easily avail-
able for most countries. I prefer ShaPrimEx for reasons that I will explain later.
Sachs and Warner (1995) prefer the share of primary exports in GDP (ShaPrimGDP).
They argue that the effect of natural resources should depend on the amount of natural
resources in the economy, and not so much on their share in export revenue. It is possi-
ble, for example, that in a rather closed economy with little exports these few exports
happen to be primary goods. The importance of the natural resource endowment to the
economy could still be small, but its share in exports relatively high. This would result
in a high value of ShaPrimEx, although the economy is actually not very dependent on
natural resources. However, there is no reason to suspect a systematic bias in Sha-
PrimEx.
Of course, it would be ideal to have an objective measure like “total value of natural
resources within the country’s borders”, but such a measure is not available for the tran-
sition countries.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2, respectively, plot one indicator of natural resource abundance
against average growth of real GDP per capita. In both figures, the negative relation is
obvious. Natural resource abundance does seem to be associated with slow (or pro-
longed negative) growth.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 22
FIGURE 4.1








0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,3


























































0,0 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,8 1,0

















































I run four regressions to test this relationship: One with ShaPrimEx, one with Sha-
PrimGDP, and then with their respective natural logarithms. Table 4.1 summarises the
results:The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 23
TABLE 4.1
The Curse of Natural Resources
Dependent variable: AvGroRGDPpC
Regression 1 1a 2 2a
Independent
Variable
ShaPrimGDP LOG(ShaPrimGDP) ShaPrimEx LOG(ShaPrimEx)
Coefficient -22,3713012 -5,5723879 -11,9203259 -9,7376976
p-value 0,0169323 0,0123014 0,0000023 0,0000041
R²-adjusted 0,2377313 0,2618382 0,7047214 0,6845697
Table 4.1 shows that for both indicators of natural resource abundance, and for dif-
ferent specifications, the results are essentially the same: Among the transition coun-
tries, natural resource abundance is strongly correlated with slow (and prolonged nega-
tive) economic growth.
I find that the result is much stronger for ShaPrimEx than for ShaPrimGDP. This
finding is in line with Sachs and Warner (1995), who also found stronger results for this
indicator.
I choose to use ShaPrimEx from now on as indicator for three reasons:
–  Especially in transition economies, it may be a more reliable measure. It is widely 
believed that natural resource abundant countries tend to have more corrupt 
governments, so they will have a larger share of shadow economy in GDP. If this 
is true, GDP may be underestimated, and ShaPrimGDP may be biased. Export 
statistics are probably more reliable.
–  I think that it provides a more intuitive interpretation.
–  It yields stronger results.
In general, the main conclusions from this section are the same whatever indicator is
used. In Section 4.4, I mention the differences that arise when using ShaPrimGDP in-
stead of ShaPrimEx.
Table 4.2 shows that natural resource abundant countries did not only grow slower,
they also reached the trough of growth later than other countries. The trough is defined
as the year with the lowest GDP since the beginning of the period. All transition econo-
mies contracted in the early stages of transition, but most of them recovered sooner or
later and returned to positive growth figures.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 24
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Countries like Poland, Romania, and Slovenia, reached their trough very early. Ro-
mania and Slovenia did so in 1992, Poland as early as 1991. These three countries are
not natural resource abundant.
Russia, with a primary export share of 57%, reached its trough only in 1998, and
Moldova, with a primary export share of 73%, had not even reached the trough in 1999.
These data also indicate that natural resource abundant transition economies per-
formed on overall much worse than those with little natural resources.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 25
4.2 Testing for possible bias
As already mentioned in Section 2.2, it is in principle possible that the seemingly obvi-
ous association of natural resource abundance with low growth may be the result of a
possible bias in the indicator. As Sachs and Warner (2001) point out, ShaPrimGDP may
be a biased indicator because of an omitted variable error. If, for example, economic
growth would depend on some other variable like geography, those countries with a
favourable geography would grow faster than others. After some time, they would have
a higher GDP. If all countries had the same amount of natural resource endowments, the
poorer countries would appear to be more resource abundant simply because their GDP
was lower, so that the share of primary goods in GDP would be higher. Under these
circumstances, an observer would find an association of natural resource abundance
with low growth, although there is no causal relationship.
The same reasoning goes for my preferred estimator ShaPrimEx: Countries with a
favourable geography would tend to grow faster, and along with GDP growth would
come export growth. With rising total exports, the share of primary exports would de-
cline, and I would also find a negative correlation.
In order to test for the likelihood of bias, Sachs and Warner (2001) propose a simple
test: If there is an important factor like geography, then countries with a favourable ge-
ography will always grow faster, not only in the time period being considered. Since
their dataset concerns the years 1970-1990, they include growth during the 1960s as an
additional variable in a regression. If there is an important variable like geography ex-
plaining growth, then the effect of this variable will be captured by the variable that
measures past growth. The effect that remains for natural resource abundance is then the
true effect of natural resource abundance on growth (although this in turn may be corre-
lated with other variables).
I perform a similar test with a measure of average annual GDP growth from 1980 to
1989. Note that this is not GDP per capita. I use this measure because it is readily avail-
able, and it should serve well enough as a proxy.
Table 4.3 summarises the result of the test for omitted geography bias. The first result
is that the coefficient for ShaPrimEx is still negative and very significant. Thus, the evi-
dence for the Curse survives this test easily.
If there was an omitted geography bias, this would be indicated by a positive coeffi-
cient. It is therefore rather puzzling to see a negative (and pretty significant) coefficient
for growth in the 1980s. There is some evidence that fast growth in the 1980s was actu-
ally associated with slow growth in the 1990s.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 26
TABLE 4.3
Test for omitted geography bias
Dependent variable AvGroRGDP





Coefficient Standard Error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 2,12297159 0,81360618 2,60933561 0,01832268
ShaPrimEx -11,0407386 1,66802137 -6,61906305 4,3445E-06
Growth8089 -0,51002617 0,24796792 -2,05682323 0,05538458
FIGURE 4.3
























































The negative relationship between growth in the 80s and growth in the 90s can be
seen in Figure 4.3. There are two possible explanations:
The observed pattern may be the result of convergence. Countries that grew slowly
during the 80s could grow relatively faster in the 90s because of knowledge spillovers or
other effects. If there is indeed convergence among the transition countries, one could
test this by including the initial income per capita in a regression. I do so in the next
section and find that there is no conditional convergence. In fact, there is even evidence
for divergence. Therefore, this explanation is not credible.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 27
It is probably more likely that the pattern arises due to the statistical peculiarities that
prevailed in the transition economies prior to 1989. Company managers as well as gov-
ernment officials had incentives to cheat and exaggerate figures in order to increase their
perceived performance. It is possible, and indeed likely, that for some of these countries
growth figures for the 1980s are somewhat over-estimated.
During the 1990s, statistical offices were only being set up in most transition econo-
mies. Until 1989, statistical figures from communist countries were widely believed to
be manipulated, overstating a country’s economic performance significantly.
Unless figures in all countries were overstated by exactly the same proportion (which
would be very unlikely), some countries’ growth figures were more overstated than others.
As statistical practices were improved and past errors corrected, and the new practices
revealed the true figures, growth in the early 1990s may have been understated in these
countries.
4.3 Robustness Analysis: Stepwise Regression
In a stepwise regression, I start by estimating a model with the average annual growth of
real GDP per capita as dependent variable and a wide range of variables that can plausi-
bly be expected to explain growth as independent variables. I then eliminate the least
significant one and run a regression on this reduced model. This procedure should result
in a model that contains only significant variables and still explains a large part of the
variation in growth.
In the first regression, I have eight explanatory variables:
–  The share of primary goods in exports (ShaPrimEx) as a proxy for natural resource
abundance
–  Real GDP per capita in 1989 (RGDPpC89) in US dollars as a measure of initial in-
come, controlling for conditional convergence
–  An index of trade liberalisation (TradLib) as a proxy for trade openness
–  Gross capital formation (CapForm); this is approximately the same as gross domes-
tic investment
–  An index measuring the extent of corruption in the state apparatus (SCI)
–  The gross secondary enrolment rate in 1990 (SecEnrol90) as a proxy for the initial
stock of human capital
–  The average annual growth of exports between 1994 and 1999 (ExGro9499)
–  The average annual growth of the population between 1989 and 1999 (PopGro8999)
A detailed description of the data, its sources and the reasons why I have used these









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -0,34994036 21,4480685 -0,01631571 0,98730346
ShaPrimEx -9,00565611 2,44982414 -3,67604187 0,00427423
LOG(RGDPpC89) 3,40778512 1,71367960 1,98857775 0,07479748
TradLib 0,40729916 0,40256091 1,01177028 0,33550217
LOG(CapForm) -7,77819003 4,26033497 -1,82572265 0,09785768
SCI 2,97926160 5,38629211 0,55311920 0,59233128
LOG(SecEnrol90) -2,13034308 10,7264525 -0,19860649 0,84655026
ExGro9499 0,18349003 0,06919611 2,65173917 0,02424058
PopGro8999 1,11799161 0,82056184 1,36247088 0,20294476
Table 4.4 shows the results of Regression 1, with eight explanatory variables. Ad-
justed R² is 77 percent, which indicates that the variables explain a large part of the
variation in average growth rates.
In Regression 1, four variables are significant at a 10 percent error level: ShaPrimEx,
LOG(RGDPpC89), LOG(CapForm), and ExGro9499.
The negative coefficient on ShaPrimEx and the low p-value (less than 1 percent)
provide some rather impressive evidence for the curse of natural resources. A large
share of primary goods in total exports is obviously strongly associated with low eco-
nomic growth. The size of the coefficient on ShaPrimEx means that an increase of ten
percentage points in the share of primary goods in total exports would decrease expected
growth by 0.9 percent.
The positive coefficient on RGDPpC89 provides an interesting mystery: According
to most growth models, there should be conditional convergence among countries. This
would be reflected in a negative coefficient on initial income in a cross-country regres-
sion, and indeed, most empirical studies come to this result.
One might speculate that in the context of the transition economies, those countries
which had relatively high income levels in 1989 were given a head start. Maybe for
them it was easier to adopt Western practices and institutions in the way of organising
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The negative coefficient on gross capital formation is also difficult to explain: Why is
high investment associated with slow growth? I have to admit that the indicator is
somewhat weak, because extensive data were only available from 1996 on. But if the
data were just inaccurate, the variable would probably be insignificant.
The positive coefficient on export growth may have two explanations: Either, exports
grew along with GDP simply because all else being equal, a larger economy will always
export more than a small one. But it also possible and quite likely that export growth
directly raises GDP growth. Trade liberalisation and export promotion policies are said
to be welfare-enhancing exactly because exports raise overall growth.
SCI, with a p-value of 59.2 percent, is very insignificant. Furthermore, as I show in
Section 5.1, it is closely correlated with ShaPrimEx, so that its presence reduces the
significance of ShaPrimEx. Therefore, I exclude SCI and run the reduced regression









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -5,2043092 13,0697141 -0,3981961 0,69747918
ShaPrimEx -8,1869620 1,93863570 -4,22305337 0,00118248
LOG(RGDPpC89) 3,04151025 1,51996937 2,00103391 0,06853058
TradLib 0,45978730 0,36547420 1,25805680 0,23230016
LOG(CapForm) -6,69862595 3,53888140 -1,89286534 0,08273886
LOG(SecEnrol90) 0,35392814 6,33850760 0,05583777 0,95638998
ExGro9499 0,16483059 0,05714503 2,88442581 0,01371740
PopGro8999 0,85986312 0,70617341 1,21763735 0,24676397
The number of observations has increased to 20 because Macedonia is now included,
too (No SCI value for Macedonia was available).
In comparison with Regression 1, one may note first that adjusted R² has gone up to
78.8%. This indicates that SCI was indeed insignificant and it was good to drop it.
Concerning the sizes of the coefficients, few substantial changes have occurred. The
coefficient on ShaPrimEx has decreased in size, but is still of the same magnitude. TheOsteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 30
largest change has occurred in the coefficient on SecEnrol90, which has gone up from –
2.13 to 0.35. The coefficient has changed its sign, and the p-value of 95.6 percent indi-
cates that this variable is now completely insignificant.
Dropping SCI has improved most p-values. Except for SecEnrol90 and PopGro, all
variables are now more significant than in Regression 1. This provides further evidence
that SCI should have been dropped.
Most interestingly, the p-value of ShaPrimEx has fallen as a result of dropping SCI,
from 0.4 percent to 0.1 percent. This indicates that there was multicollearity between
SCI and ShaPrimEx.
The next logical step is to exclude SecEnrol90, because it is completely insignificant.









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -4,53762682 5,10836282 -0,88827419 0,39053288
ShaPrimEx -8,17260301 1,84636159 -4,42632855 0,00068372
LOG(RGDPpC89) 3,03151776 1,45037088 2,09016728 0,05681696
TradLib 0,45577109 0,34431380 1,32370844 0,20840627
LOG(CapForm) -6,65841351 3,32933291 -1,99992422 0,06684943
ExGro9499 0,16583659 0,05210986 3,18244158 0,00720714
PopGro8999 0,85122159 0,66206193 1,28571295 0,22097416
Excluding SecEnrol90 has improved the fit of the regression. R²-adjusted has gone
up to 80.4%, which is quite satisfactory. The coefficients of the remaining variables are
almost unchanged from regression 2, and all p-values have improved. It was definitely
right to exclude SecEnrol90.
Four of the six remaining variables are significant at a 10 percent error level. Two of
them are even more significant.
ShaPrimEx is now very significant, with a p-value of 0.0007 percent. There is no
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exports, has a significant negative impact on growth. The size of the coefficient is al-
most unchanged from Regression 2, from –8.19 to –8.17.
The positive coefficient on RGDPpC89 persists. It is now significant with a p-value
of only 5.7 percent, and its size is almost unchanged from regression 2.
TradLib is not sufficiently significant, but it is not completely insignificant either,
with a p-value of 20.8 percent.
The negative sign on CapForm still provides something of a mystery. It is now sig-
nificant with a p-value of 6.7 percent, so it cannot be easily rejected.
Export growth is by now significant at an error level of only one percent. The relation
between export growth and economic growth is thus proven.
The coefficient on PopGro8999 is still positive, but not very significant.
Since neither TradLib nor PopGro8999 are sufficiently significant, I try to exclude










Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -3,55012865 5,16674125 -0,68711175 0,50323630
ShaPrimEx -8,48773559 1,87221662 -4,53352220 0,00046820
LOG(RGDPpC89) 2,14752321 1,30649226 1,64373205 0,12249193
TradLib 0,36941950 0,34548644 1,06927351 0,30303662
LOG(CapForm) -4,78629716 3,06307183 -1,56258077 0,14046752
ExGro9499 0,15742467 0,05288953 2,97648090 0,01000717
Unfortunately, R²-adjusted decreases slightly.
The p-values of most of the other variables have increased. RGDPpC89 and Cap-
Form are no longer significant at a 10 percent error level.









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -3,48259620 5,17958132 -0,67237021 0,51229298
ShaPrimEx -9,10100222 1,75324748 -5,19093984 0,00013683
LOG(RGDPpC89) 3,16915540 1,48499358 2,13412061 0,05100184
LOG(CapForm) -6,09225783 3,38928508 -1,79750528 0,09385145
ExGro9499 0,14538935 0,05108725 2,84590283 0,01295418
PopGro8999 0,68027407 0,66656041 1,02057377 0,32476944
Regression 5 is inferior to Regression 3 in the sense that R²-adjusted is slightly










Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -2,82826264 5,14686412 -0,54951181 0,59074235
ShaPrimEx -9,21667701 1,75200269 -5,26065232 9,5972E-05
LOG(RGDPpC89) 2,41308195 1,28878420 1,87237084 0,08078143
LOG(CapForm) -4,62604706 3,07398697 -1,50490132 0,15311364
ExGro9499 0,14161930 0,05102408 2,77553881 0,01414018The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 33
In Regression 6, I have excluded both PopGro8999 and TradLib:
In Regression 6, there are only four explanatory variables left. All of them are sig-
nificant to a certain extent:
ShaPrimEx is by far the most significant variable. With a p-value close to zero, the
evidence for the Curse cannot be denied. The coefficient is now –9.2, which is not far
from the previous estimates.
Export Growth is also highly significant. With a p-value of 1.4 percent, the relation-
ship between export growth and GDP growth can hardly be rejected.
The significance of RGDPpC89 and CapForm is not as strong. With p-values of 8.1
percent and 15.3 percent, respectively, both variables are on the edge of being signifi-
cant.
Since none of the coefficients in Regression 6 is completely insignificant, it would be
hard to choose which one to exclude, so I decide to try something else:
I have just shown that export growth is one of the most important factors in explain-
ing growth in the transition economies. However, it is possible that export growth is
more crucial in natural resource abundant countries than in others. The reason is that
these countries are typically dependent on their export revenues to finance investment
into new capital goods. As Szirmai (1997) explains, theories of dependent development
argue that in countries that are very dependent on primary exports, the internal market is
“disrupted” in the sense that there are few linkages between the primary sector and the
rest of the economy. There is no continuous production chain from primary goods pro-
duction to manufacturing. Instead, these countries export primary goods and import
capital goods. External shocks, such as a world-wide economic downturn and a fall in
demand for this country’s exports, have a much stronger effect on these countries be-
cause the lack of export revenue causes a fall in investment. The domestic economy
cannot make the capital goods itself. Without export revenues, the country cannot pay
for capital imports, and investment falls. Since investment is crucial for future growth, a
fall in export revenue has a lasting effect on these countries’ growth rates.
In countries with little primary exports, the effect of a fall in export revenue is not
that strong. These economies are typically more diversified. Capital goods are at least
partially produced within the country. Export revenues are not spent primarily on capital
goods, but also on consumption. Thus, a fall in export revenues does not only hit in-
vestment, but reduces consumption and investment proportionately. The effect of export
growth on economic growth is less pronounced.
In order to test for this possibility, I have calculated an interaction variable to meas-
ure the effect of a combination of natural resource abundance and export growth, which
I have simply called “InterAction”. It is defined as ShaPrimEx times ExGro9499.
The idea is that if I multiply ShaPrimEx with ExGro9499, this interaction term will
take on high values for natural resource abundant countries which enjoyed high export
growth. Countries that are poorly endowed with natural resources and experienced low
export growth will have low values. Countries which have high natural resources but









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -2,47744544 4,72064786 -0,52481047 0,60792592
ShaPrimEx -12,343464 2,26133764 -5,45847898 8,427E-05
LOG(RGDPpC89) 2,00221671 1,19959798 1,66907309 0,11730256
LOG(CapForm) -2,83711121 2,96101928 -0,95815357 0,35424066
ExGro9499 -0,02449239 0,09665392 -0,25340302 0,80364011
InterAction 0,43265706 0,22031713 1,96379219 0,06972951
Table 4.10 shows the results, which offer more than one surprise:
First of all, R²-adjusted has gone up to 82.6 percent. This is the highest value for R²-
adjusted that I have seen so far. The increase in R²-adjusted together with the observa-
tion that the interaction variable itself is pretty significant, with a p-value of 7 percent,
allows me to conclude that the introduction of InterAction has improved the fit of the
regression.
Secondly, ExGro9499 is now completely insignificant, with a p-value of more than
80 percent. This comes as a surprise because in previous regressions, export growth has
always been very significant.
ShaPrimEx is still highly significant. The coefficient is larger in absolute terms. This
is not a surprise, because ShaPrimEx now measures solely the negative impact of natu-
ral resource abundance itself. If a country is natural resource abundant and enjoys strong
export growth, this positive effect may offset the negative impact of natural resource
abundance. The interpretation goes as follows: If a country enjoys no growth in exports
(InterAction then equals zero), then the curse of natural resources will reduce economic
growth. An increase of 10 percentage points in the share of primary goods in total ex-
ports will then reduce average growth by 1.2 percent per year. Export growth may offset
the negative impact.
I should also note that the other explanatory variables, initial income and gross capi-
tal formation, have become less significant.
My next step is to drop export growth from the regression, because it is now com-









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -2,48923518 4,57080402 -0,5445946 0,59403686
ShaPrimEx -11,9356474 1,53823667 -7,75930494 1,2518E-06
LOG(RGDPpC89) 2,05697922 1,14257198 1,80030603 0,09195189
LOG(CapForm) -3,12621953 2,6457899 -1,18158268 0,25576609









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -5,1525964 4,02528521 -1,28005747 0,21877353
ShaPrimEx -12,0397385 1,55460682 -7,74455528 8,4267E-07
LOG(RGDPpC89) 1,60229169 1,0890572 1,47126495 0,1606136
InterAction 0,37572511 0,1042608 3,60370443 0,00238051
Unfortunately, R²-adjusted decreases slightly, from 83.7 percent to 83.3 percent. The
exclusion of CapForm has little effect on ShaPrimEx and InterAction. Their coefficients
change by marginal amounts. The p-value of ShaPrimEx falls slightly, while that of In-
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RGDPpC89 is now considerably less significant than in Regression 8, and its coeffi-
cient has fallen from 2.06 to 1.60.
Although RGDPpC89 is not completely insignificant in Regression 9, I drop it in Re-









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Schnittpunkt 0,71407479 0,56876492 1,25548317 0,22628674
ShaPrimEx -13,1539117 1,40342276 -9,37273648 3,967E-08
InterAction 0,38511075 0,10757102 3,58006034 0,00230659
In Regression 10, R²-adjusted has fallen from 83.3 percent to 82.2 percent.
Furthermore, the coefficient on ShaPrimEx is now larger in absolute terms, and even
more significant than before. This leads me to the suspicion that ShaPrimEx might be
negatively correlated with RGDPpC89. If this is the case, ShaPrimEx now captures part
of the effect of RGDPpC89 on growth, since RGDPpC89 is excluded.
The coefficient and p-value of InterAction are virtually unchanged by the exclusion
of RGDPpC89.
I conclude that Regression 9 is superior to Regression 10 because obviously,
RGDPpC89 has some explanatory power, although it is not as significant as I might
wish.
I thus have a model which powerfully explains a great part of the variation in growth
rates among transition countries with only three variables: ShaPrimEx, RGDPpC89, and
the interaction term.
The significance of ShaPrimEx provides sufficient evidence to support the hypothe-
sis that in the transition economies, there is also a curse of natural resources. Moreover,
the curse is one of the prime reasons why transition economies differ so sharply in their
growth rates.
The model shows also that in principle it is possible to offset the negative impact of
natural resources on growth by having great export growth. However, it is not likely that
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estimate that a country would need an average export growth of more than 30 percent
per year to overcome the negative impact of the curse of natural resources. Among the
transition economies, the highest average growth rate of exports is 18.7 percent in Be-
larus, well below thirty percent.
4.4 The Same Procedure with ShaPrimGDP
In the above analysis I have used ShaPrimEx, the share of primary goods in exports, as
an indicator for natural resource abundance. There are arguments for using Sha-
PrimGDP, the share of primary exports in GDP, as an indicator. In order to verify the
robustness of the results from Section 4.3, I have followed the same procedure with
ShaPrimGDP instead of ShaPrimEx.
I have replicated all the regressions from Section 4.3 with ShaPrimGDP. An “a” indi-
cates that the indicator for natural resource abundance is now ShaPrimGDP. Thus, Regres-
sion 1a is the same as Regression 1, but with ShaPrimGDP instead of ShaPrimEx. I do not
report all results from Regressions 1a to 10a because that would add little value while
blowing up the size of this paper unnecessarily. Instead, I focus on the main points.
The results, in short, are that:
–  There is also ample evidence for the curse of natural resources, though not as ample
as when I used ShaPrimEx. For ShaPrimGDP, I find p-values around 1 percent.
–  The effect of initial income is more significant and larger in size. It is significant at a
five percent error level.
–  The interaction term of ShaPrimGDP and ExGro9499 is less significant than export
growth itself. This is in contrast to the above analysis, where I found that the impact
of export growth was stronger the higher the natural resource dependence of the
economy. When using ShaPrimGDP, the effect of export growth seems to be more
symmetric.
–  Adjusted R² is lower in regressions with ShaPrimGDP. With ShaPrimEx, it reached
values of more than 80 percent. In the regressions with ShaPrimGDP, the highest
value of adjusted R² is 63.6 percent. Thus, ShaPrimEx seems to have more explana-
tory power than ShaPrimGDP.
Table 4.14 shows the results of Regression 9a, the “best” one in terms of explanatory









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -14,7091019 5,96666127 -2,46521484 0,02538718
ShaPrimGDP -28,2692288 8,29754412 -3,40693925 0,00360696
LOG(RGDPpC89) 3,95852193 1,67019832 2,37009096 0,03068977
InterAction 1,37213015 0,60146869 2,28129937 0,03656379
ShaPrimGDP has a negative coefficient and a p-value of 0.4 percent. Thus, there is
strong evidence for the Curse, also when using ShaPrimGDP.
LOG(RGDPpC89) is now remarkably more significant than in Regression 9. Its p-
value is 3.1 percent, compared to 16.1 percent in Regression 9.
InterAction is still significant, but considerably less so than in Regression 9. Its p-









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -15,4694092 5,46019823 -2,83312226 0,01199239
ShaPrimGDP -18,5386008 6,3814952 -2,90505598 0,010332
LOG(RGDPpC89) 3,76018838 1,54620338 2,43188473 0,02713807
ExGro9499 0,19914128 0,06686033 2,97846681 0,00886887The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 39
Table 4.15 shows that a modified version of Regression 9a, with ExGro9499 replac-
ing InterAction, yields a higher adjusted R².
When ShaPrimGDP is used, export growth itself provides a better regression fit than
the interaction term. In Regression 9b, the p-value on ExGro9499 is only 0.9 percent,
which is lower than the 3.7 percent that InterAction achieved in Regression 9a.
In general, ShaPrimGDP does not reach the astonishingly low p-values that Sha-
PrimEx does. This seemed like a problem in the first stages of the stepwise regression.
In Regression 1a, which is analogous to Regression 1, the p-value for ShaPrimGDP
is 24.6 percent. Thus, there is little evidence for the Curse. However, ShaPrimGDP is
still one of the more significant variables. Due to the strong correlation between natural
resource abundance and corruption, there is multicollinearity between ShaPrimGDP and
SCI.
Some other results from Regression 1 also change in Regression 1a. Aside from the
reduced significance of ShaPrimGDP, most of the other p-values also change, some-
times substantially. Adjusted R² is only 53.6 percent compared to the 77.3 percent in
table 4.4.
In both cases, SCI is highly insignificant. Furthermore, its presence obscures the ef-
fect of natural resource abundance on growth: SCI and ShaPrimEx (or ShaPrimGDP)
are closely correlated, as I show in Section 5.1, so that multicollinearity arises if both are
included.
Thus, when I drop SCI from the regression in Regression 2a, the p-value of Sha-
PrimGDP immediately falls to 10.2 percent.
Excluding further insignificant variables improves the significance of ShaPrimGDP.
In Regression 4a, it becomes for the first time significant at a five percent error level. In
Regression 6a, which has the highest value for adjusted R², ShaPrimGDP is highly sig-
nificant with a p-value of 0.8 percent. Thus, there is once again strong evidence for the
curse of natural resources.
A particularly eye-catching effect is that LOG(RGDPpC89) is more significant when
ShaPrimGDP is used instead of ShaPrimEx. In every single regression, its p-value is
lower in the “a”-version than in the original one. Depending on which other variables
are in the model, the p-value of LOG(RGDPpC89) moves between one and three per-
cent and is usually close to two percent.
This is one of the reasons why I believe in the importance of initial income per cap-
ita. It is definitely significant if ShaPrimGDP is used and almost significant if Sha-
PrimEx is used.
It is not only more significant when ShaPrimGDP is used; the size of the coefficient
on LOG(RGDPpC89) is also larger. In Regression 1a-9a, the coefficient of
LOG(RGDPpC89) hovers between 4 and 5 and slightly above. In the original regres-
sions, in contrast, it takes on values between 1.6 and 3.5.
Another important observation is that when ShaPrimGDP is used, the interaction
term is not as powerful as with ShaPrimEx. In Regression 7a, ExGro9499 is still pretty
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with a p-value of 76.7 percent. This is in contrast to Regression 7, where InterAction
was significant and ExGro9499 was not.
This raises some doubt about the notion that export growth is more important for
natural resource abundant countries than for others. However, InterAction is still signifi-
cant when ExGro9499 is not included. In Regression 9a, its p-value is 3.7 percent, so
the effect is not completely rejected. However, in Regression 9 the p-value for InterAc-
tion is less than one percent, so the evidence there is much stronger.
One must keep in mind that if ShaPrimGDP is used, the interaction term takes differ-
ent values because ShaPrimGDP now also replaces ShaPrimEx in the definition of In-
terAction.
LOG(CapForm) is more significant in most of the regressions with ShaPrimGDP, but
not in all of them. It reaches its lowest p-value, 11.7 percent, in Regression 6a. In Re-
gression 6, its p-value was 15.3 percent.
The coefficient on LOG(CapForm) remains negative and of comparable size. How-
ever, it is still strange that high savings rates seem to be negatively correlated with eco-
nomic growth.
Finally, the other variables are still not significant. SCI reaches a p-value of 98.8 per-
cent in Regression 1a, which is one of the most spectacular p-values I have ever seen,
and is therefore excluded. Once again, I stress that the perceived insignificance of SCI is
caused by the multicollinearity between SCI and ShaPrimGDP.
LOG(SenEnrol90) is excluded because its p-value is 86.7 percent in Regression 2a.
In Regression 3a, TradLib and PopGro8999 reach p-values of 42.7 percent and 40.3
percent, respectively, and are therefore excluded. They are considerably less significant
than in Regression 3, where their p-value were 20.8 percent and 22.1 percent, respec-
tively. TradLib has (as expected) a positive coefficient, and PopGro8999 has (unlike
expected) a positive coefficient, too.
I conclude from this section that the effect of the curse of natural resources is robust.
When ShaPrimGDP is used instead of ShaPrimEx, there is still sufficient evidence for
the Curse, though weaker than with ShaPrimEx.
Furthermore, ShaPrimEx seems to have more explanatory power than ShaPrimGDP,
because it leads to higher values of adjusted R². This might indicate that the impact of
natural resources depends more on their share in exports than in GDP, but this idea is
only speculative.
4.5 Evidence for the Curse: A Short Summary
In this section I have shown that there is ample evidence for the curse of natural re-
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As a measure for natural resource abundance, I have used the share of primary goods
in total exports. This measure is only a proxy for the natural resource endowment of an
economy, but it is not biased and readily available for most countries.
Verification with ShaPrimGDP as indicator instead of ShaPrimEx provides further
evidence for the existence of the curse of natural resources in the transition economies.
In the regression results, ShaPrimGDP is not as significant as ShaPrimEx, but it reaches
p-values of around one percent, which is definitely low enough to be called significant.
Thus, the evidence for the Curse is not a result of data mining. Using different indicators
for natural resource abundance still leads to the same result.
I have shown that there is a negative association of natural resource abundance and
economic growth. This negative association is statistically significant and of remarkable
size. Precisely, if the share of primary goods in total exports is by ten percentage points
higher in one country than in an otherwise similar country, the first country is estimated
to grow slower by roughly one percent per year.
The relationship between natural resource abundance and growth is not independent
of export growth: A natural resource abundant country may offset the negative impact of
natural resources on growth by having strong export growth.
The curse of natural resources is one of the most important factors in explaining
growth in the transition economies: Other common variables, like secondary enrolment
ratios as a proxy for human capital or population growth, appear to have little impact on
growth.
There is no evidence for conditional convergence among the transition economies:
Countries that were relatively rich in 1989 tended to grow faster than poorer countries
during the 1990s. This effect is visible in all regressions, even when a wide range of
other explanatory factors is controlled for. The positive coefficient on
LOG(RGDPpC89) could mean that economies that were relatively well developed in
1989 were in a better position to deal with the difficulties of transition than others and
recovered earlier, and that therefore there was no convergence.
I believe that the most enlightening regression is Regression 9, with ShaPrimEx,
RGDPpcC89, and the interaction term as explanatory factors. These three variable ex-
plain more than 80 percent of the variation in growth among transition economies.
Natural resource abundance clearly imposes a drag on growth. This negative effect
can be partially offset by high export growth, which has a great effect on growth in natu-
ral resource abundant countries. However, to offset the curse completely, a country’s
exports would have to grow by more then 30 percent annually, a value which is almost
never reached in practice.
Initial income in this regression can be interpreted as a general term capturing the
initial condition of the economy in 1989. In Regression 9 it is only mildly significant,
but in Regression 9a, with ShaPrimGDP instead of ShaPrimEx, it is statistically signifi-
cant at a five percent error level, indicating that countries that were in good economic
shape in 1989 achieved relatively high growth rates in the 1990s.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 42
5 Reasons for the Curse
Now that I have shown that the Curse exists in the transition economies, it is time to
think about the reasons for the curse. In section 2 I have mentioned several common and
plausible explanations for the Curse. I will now analyse the most common explanations
to see whether they apply to the transition economies or not. I proceed as follows:
I consider a variable X that may be a plausible explanation for the Curse, for example
corruption. In theory, natural resource abundance leads to serious corruption, and seri-
ous corruption leads to low growth. Thus, natural resource abundance must have an im-
pact on X, and X in turn must have an impact on growth. Only then the explanation is
credible.
For each X, I proceed in three steps:
In the first step, I examine the relationship between natural resource abundance and
X. If there is no statistically significant relationship, the variable X is “out”: It is not
correlated with natural resource abundance, so it cannot explain differences between
natural resource abundant countries and other countries. Only if X is somehow corre-
lated with natural resource abundance, the analysis proceeds.
In the second step, I examine the relationship between X and growth of real GDP per
capita. If there is significant relationship, I can conclude that X is a variable which ex-
plains a part of the curse of natural resources.
In the third step, I try to estimate the size of the effect. It is possible that a variable
passes both the first and the second step of my analysis, but that the size of the effect is
too small to explain a significant fraction of the total effect of natural resource on
growth. Then I have made little progress in explaining the Curse.
5.1 Rent-seeking (Corruption)
One plausible explanation for the Curse is that natural resource abundance leads to rent-
seeking in the government, the state apparatus, and the business class. A common form
of rent-seeking in government circles is corruption, but there are also other possibilities:
Tariff barriers are often the result of rent-seeking by domestic producers, who lobby the
government to erect tariffs to protect domestic industries.
If rent-seeking is a plausible explanation, I would have to find a positive correlation
between natural resource abundance and the extent of rent-seeking. This is the first step
in my analysis.
The problem with corruption is that it is impossible to measure directly. By defini-
tion, corruption takes place where it cannot be observed, so there are no numerical data
on corruption available. Even if they were, one could hardly know which data to use.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 43
The amount of total bribes paid in the economy? The ratio of corrupt government offi-
cials to honest ones?
Furthermore, as I pointed out in section 2, it is not entirely clear what corruption ac-
tually is. There is corruption in the government, but also in the private sector. Some
forms of corruption are illegal, others are not.
However, since corruption is often considered an important determinant of economic
performance, econometricians have been quite innovative in this respect. Several studies
have constructed indexes which indicate the extent of corruption in a country.
In this paper, I use the State Capture Index (SCI) as a measure for the extent of cor-
ruption, which was constructed by Hellman, Jones, and Kaufmann with data from the
Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey conducted by the World
Bank in 1999. This index measures the extent to which decisions by the government, the
central bank, and the courts can be, or have to be, “bought” by firms. The larger the in-
dex, the greater the extent of corruption. In contrast to other corruption indexes, the
State Capture Index is available for almost all of the transition economies, because the
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Figure 5.1 plots the relation between SCI and the share of primary goods in total ex-
ports. At a first glance, the relation appears to be strongly positive. To quantify this re-
lation, I run a regression on SCI with ShaPrimEx as explanatory variable.
Table 5.1 shows the results:Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 44
TABLE 5.1
Natural Resource Abundance and Corruption
Dependent variable SCI





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 0,08214085 0,03907924 2,10190517 0,05077224
ShaPrimEx 0,31881751 0,09429913 3,38091674 0,00355144
There is indeed a very strong correlation between natural resource abundance and
corruption. The coefficient is not easily interpreted, because the index is an abstract
measure, but the p-value of 0.0036 means that the relationship is statistically very sig-
nificant.
The size of R² gives further confidence: It indicates that about 40 percent of the
variation in corruption can be explained by natural resource abundance. Obviously,
natural resources are an important determinant of corruption.


























































Figure 5.2 plots SCI against the average annual growth of real GDP per capita in per-
cent. The relationship appears to be negative, which would imply that the explanation isThe curse of natural resources in the transition economies 45










Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 0,27828993 1,21333458 0,22935960 0,82091870
SCI -19,5980626 5,39868293 -3,63015626 0,00166731
Table 5.2 shows that corruption is strongly associated with low economic growth.
The number of observations has increased to 22 in comparison with Table 5.1 because
SCI and AvGroRGDPpC are available for almost all countries.
The p-value on SCI is less than one percent. This provides ample evidence for a
negative impact of corruption on economic growth.
The size of the coefficient is also interesting: An increase of 0.1 in the state capture
index is expected to decrease annual growth by 1.9 percent. Given that the value of SCI
varies from 0.058 in Uzbekistan to 0.412 in Azerbaijan, a difference of 0.1 in SCI is not
very much. Thus, the effect of corruption on growth appears to be not only significant,
but also surprisingly large.
The third step in my analysis is to estimate the size of the total effect of natural re-
source abundance via the corruption channel. I run a regression on AvGroRGDPpC with
both ShaPrimEx and SCI as explanatory variables:Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 46
TABLE 5.3
Direct Effects of Corruption and Natural Resources on Growth
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 1,62612437 0,82694019 1,96643527 0,06684308
SCI -4,79976184 4,57233996 -1,04973862 0,3094364
ShaPrimEx -10,4807276 2,29900119 -4,5588178 0,00032196
SCI is now rather insignificant, because it is so closely correlated with ShaPrimEx.
The direct effect of ShaPrimEx on growth is estimated to be –10.5. The indirect ef-
fect is found by multiplying its effect on SCI with the direct effect of SCI on growth:
-4.8 * 0.319 = – 1.531
The total effect of ShaPrimEx on growth is now:
-10.481 + (-1.531) = - 12.012
The part of the Curse that is explained by rent-seeking behaviour is:
1.531 : 12.012 = 0.127
In words: Roughly one tenth of the curse of natural resources is explained by the
rent-seeking effect. If a country could manage to eliminate rent-seeking completely, the
curse of natural resources would be reduced by about 13 percent.
This estimate is of course not very exact. The high standard error on SCI in table 5.3
means that the estimate of the effect of SCI on growth is pretty inaccurate. This is an
example of multicollinearity: The correlation between SCI and ShaPrimEx is so strong
that it is almost impossible to disentangle their individual effects on AvGroRGPpC.
One way to deal with the problem of multicollinearity is to use an instrumental vari-
able for SCI instead of the true values. The idea is to find a model which explains the
variation in SCI among countries. Then, the values of the explanatory variables are used
to compute the estimated value of SCI in each country, the value that SCI “should” have
if the model was perfect.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 47
I perform a stepwise regression on SCI to find out which factors determine the extent
of corruption in a country. The result is a model with only two remaining explanatory









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 0,15346394 0,04952185 3,098913945 0,00689555
ShaPrimEx 0,25659606 0,09127347 2,811288677 0,01254568
ExGro9499 -0,00623037 0,00299469 -2,080467814 0,05391159
Table 5.4 shows that ShaPrimEx and ExGro9499 together explain roughly a half of
the variation in SCI among countries. Other variables, such as GDP per capita or secon-
dary enrolment rates, were insignificant.
Once again, the strong positive correlation between natural resource abundance and
corruption becomes obvious: The coefficient on ShaPrimEx is positive and highly sig-
nificant, with a p-value of 1.2 percent.
There is a negative association between corruption and export growth. With a p-value
of 5.4 percent, and a t-statistic greater than 2, this relationship is statistically significant.
The direction of causality is not entirely clear: It may be the case that corruption poses
an impediment to international trade, and so countries with high corruption would have
low growth in exports. But it is also possible that under high export growth, business-
men and government officials learn the practices and rules of conduct from efficiently
governed foreign economies.
I use the coefficient estimates from Table 5.4 to calculate the instrumental variable
for SCI, which I call SCI*. It is defined as:
SCI* = 0.15346 + 0.25660 ShaPrimEx – 0.00623 ExGro9499
Next, I run a regression on AvGroRGDPpC with ShaPrimEx and SCI* as explana-
tory variables in order to find out the effect of each variable. Table 5.5 shows the result:Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 48
TABLE 5.5
The Effects of ShaPrimEx and SCI* on Growth
Dependent variable AvGroRGPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 2,85360913 0,96548602 2,95561933 0,008853
ShaPrimEx -5,61941383 3,08887728 -1,81924153 0,08653291
SCI* -19,9851717 8,45060352 -2,36494017 0,03018879
In Table 5.4 there were only 19 observations, because I have no SCI value for Mace-
donia, but since SCI* can be calculated for Macedonia just as for any other country, I
have a value for SCI* in Macedonia. Thus, Macedonia does not drop out in Table 5.5.
Since ShaPrimEx and SCI* are not as closely correlated as ShaPrimEx and SCI are,
both variables are now (more or less) significant. Thus, the coefficient estimates from
this regression should be more credible.
The indirect effect of ShaPrimEx on AvGroRGDPpC via SCI* is:
- 19.9852 * 0.2566 = - 5.1282
The direct effect of ShaPrimEx on AvGroRGDPpC is now estimated to be –5.6194.
Thus, the total effect of ShaPrimEx on AvGroRGDPpC is:
- 5.1282 – 5.6194 = 10.7476
This is not exactly the estimate of –12.04 from Regression 9, but it is close to it.
According to this estimation, the indirect effect via SCI* is almost as large as the di-
rect effect of ShaPrimEx on growth. This means that possibly almost half of the curse of
natural resources could be attributed to corruption.
This result should not be taken too serious. It is not robust: If I include
LOG(RGDPpC89) and the interaction term in the last regression, SCI* becomes insig-
nificant again, and its coefficient becomes positive.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 49
However, the regression with SCI* shows that it is possible that corruption accounts
for almost half of the Curse. Unfortunately, my corruption index SCI and natural re-
source measure ShaPrimEx are so closely correlated that it is almost impossible to dis-
entangle their effects on growth. Further research in this area could be extremely valu-
able.
5.2 The Dutch Disease
The Dutch disease has its name from the difficulties that the Dutch economy faced after
natural gas was discovered and extraction had begun on a large scale. In an economy
that suffers from the Dutch disease, the revenues from primary exports raise the pur-
chasing power of the economy. The additional wealth is at least partially spent on non-
tradable goods and services. Since purchasing power parity does not hold for non-
tradables, the price of these goods is free to rise even under free trade.
The rise in prices for non-tradables creates problems for the manufacturing sector:
Among non-tradables are crucial inputs for manufacturing production, such as wages
and rents for buildings. Due to the high input prices the manufacturing sector is interna-
tionally not competitive. Exports of manufactures thus grow slower. Depending on
transport costs and tariffs, foreign producers may enter the market and drive prices
down, so that domestic producers cannot compete. This would reduce the growth of the
manufacturing sector as a whole.
Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that manufacturing may exhibit positive externalities
for the economy as a whole. They say that in manufacturing, technological progress is
achieved simply through learning-by-doing. In other sectors, there is less learning-by-
doing. If this is true, the crippling of the manufacturing sector due to high price levels
will have a lasting negative effect on growth.
As suggested by Sachs and Warner, I have constructed a proxy for the relative price
level of a country by dividing GNP valued at market exchange rates by GNP valued at
the purchasing power parity rate, with both figures for 1999. This way , I compare do-
mestic prices with an international average of prices.
I first examine the relationship between natural resource abundance and relative price
levels:Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 50
FIGURE 5.3
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Figure 5.3 shows that there is no obvious relationship between natural resource
abundance and relative price levels. Furthermore, virtually all transition economies
(with the exception of Latvia and Lithuania) have relatively low price levels.
Nevertheless, I run a regression to see whether this is really true:
TABLE 5.6
The effect of ShaPrimEx on RelPrice
Dependent variable RelPrice





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 0,50839711 0,10295211 4,9381905 0,00012473
ShaPrimEx -0,27248144 0,25498015 -1,06863785 0,30017307
In table 5.6, there is no evidence for a positive relation between natural resource
abundance and relative price levels. If anything, there could even be a negative relation-
ship.
However, this picture may be slightly blurred by the fact that in relatively rich coun-
tries, price levels tend to be higher. Sachs and Warner (2001) therefore include per cap-
ita income to control for this effect. Then they find a significant positive effect of natu-
ral resource abundance on price levels.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 51
I follow their example and run a regression on RelPrice with GDP per capita and
ShaPrimEx as explanatory variables. Table 5.7 shows the results:
TABLE 5.7
The effect of ShaPrimEx and GDPpC on RelPrice
Dependent variable RelPrice





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 0,34335369 0,18435950 1,86241385 0,08224903
ShaPrimEx -0,08334389 0,31874747 -0,26147311 0,79728386
GDPpC 4,0523E-05 3,0131E-05 1,34489789 0,19864158
While GDPpC seems to have the expected effect of raising the relative price level of
a country, ShaPrimEx is still insignificant. I therefore try several different specifica-
tions:
TABLE 5.8
Evidence for the Dutch disease
Dependent variable RelPrice





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -0,34002636 0,31819167 -1,06862118 0,30332048
ShaPrimEx 3,1341004 1,32628839 2,36306103 0,03312783
GDPpC 7,9745E-05 3,043E-05 2,62057338 0,02015343
ShaPrimEx² -3,20235247 1,29137544 -2,47979973 0,02647932Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 52
Table 5.8 shows that with the correct specification, I can find relatively strong evi-
dence for Dutch disease effects: Including the square of ShaPrimEx leads to the ex-
pected finding: ShaPrimEx, ShaPrimEx², and GDPpC are now all significant at a five
percent error level.
GDP per capita has the expected effect of raising the relative price level.
Natural resource abundance also appears to increase the relative price level of an
economy. The effect is more pronounced at low levels of ShaPrimEx and diminishes as
ShaPrimEx increases. It is estimated to be positive until ShaPrimEx reaches a value of
97.9 percent. Since no country in my sample is even close to such a value, the effect is
positive in the relevant range.
I have thus shown that natural resource abundance indeed tends to increase a coun-
try’s price level. This is likely to impose a drag on the manufacturing sector’s interna-
tional competitiveness.
The second step in the test for Dutch disease effects is to examine whether the in-
crease in relative price levels in turn affects the growth rate of an economy.
FIGURE 5.4
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Figure 5.4 makes it clear at a glance that this is very unlikely. On the x-axis I have
plotted the relative price level of a country, calculated by dividing GDP in US dollars at
market exchange rates by GDP in US dollars at purchasing power parity. The y-axis
plots the average growth of income per capita against this.
From the figure, there seems to be a rather strong positive correlation between rela-
tive price levels and growth of income per capita. Nevertheless, I run a regression to
verify this suspicion:The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 53
TABLE 5.9
Growth and Relative Price Levels
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -5,57287162 1,40959988 -3,95351311 0,00078429
RelPrice 4,82104071 3,07052770 1,57010168 0,13207803
Table 5.9 shows the result of this test. There is indeed evidence for a positive corre-
lation between growth and relative price levels, though not very strong. With a p-value
of 13.2 percent, RelPrice is not extremely significant, and R²-adjusted is very low. I
therefore try to find further verification of the result.
Figure 5.4 suggests that the positive effect of relative prices on growth might be di-
minishing. The regression line would then be hill-shaped. This would mean that Rel-
Price² would be significant in a regression on growth. I therefore run a regression with
RelPrice and RelPrice². The results are reported in table 5.10.
TABLE 5.10
Growth and Relative Price Levels II
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -16,3910391 2,33577078 -7,01740052 1,1081E-06
RelPrice 55,104516 10,1419674 5,43331621 3,0485E-05
RelPrice² -43,1806326 8,52862407 -5,06302449 6,9076E-05Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 54
Table 5.10 shows that my suspicion was probably right: Including RelPrice² im-
proves the fit of the regression tremendously. R²-adjusted shoots up from 6.5 percent to
58.1 percent, and both regressors are highly significant.
Both coefficients also have the expected sign. As relative prices rise, the positive cor-
relation with growth diminishes and finally levels off or becomes even negative. How-
ever, in the range where the transition economies lie, the relation between RelPrice and
growth is still positive.
Of course, the result seems to contradict all economic intuition: Why should coun-
tries that have a relatively high price level grow faster than others? If there is a causal
relationship, it can only be the other way around: Countries that have grown fast may
have higher relative price levels.
Since R²-adjusted is still comparatively low, the inclusion of other explanatory vari-
ables might change the picture. In order to check for the robustness of the results of ta-
ble 5.10, I run a regression with the variables that I found most significant in Section 4,
adding RelPrice and RelPrice². Table 5.11 shows the results:
TABLE 5.11
Growth, Relative Price Levels, and Other Variables
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -7,03296979 5,08759128 -1,38237712 0,19204358
RelPrice 19,0132356 11,7752651 1,61467580 0,13235142
RelPrice² -16,6328870 8,70599722 -1,91050911 0,08025055
ShaPrimEx -9,93489730 1,80886294 -5,49234387 0,00013794
InterAction 0,38339942 0,10126327 3,78616479 0,00259430
LOG(RGDPpC89) 0,75564092 2,02479218 0,37319431 0,71551285
When ShaPrimEx, InterAction, and RGDpC89 enter the regression, RelPrice and
RelPrice² are no longer as significant as they were alone. ShaPrimEx and InterAction
are significant, as expected. RGDPpC89 is not significant. This may be due to the cor-
relation between price levels and income per capita. If both are included in one regres-
sion, their significance is lower than if only one were included.
Thus, I have at least managed to explain the evidence that high relative price levels are
associated with high growth. This observed correlation can be explained by the fact thatThe curse of natural resources in the transition economies 55
high income per capita leads to high price levels, and since the high income countries were
also those with high growth, I observe a correlation between price levels and growth.
However, I have not been able to find any evidence on a negative impact of high
price levels on growth. This provides some evidence against the Dutch disease hypothe-
sis. Natural resource abundance can be shown to increase relative prices, but as long as
relative prices do not reduce growth (which, surprisingly, they do not), the Dutch dis-
ease hypothesis is not credible.
One might argue in this context that the indicator I have used, relative price levels, is
not the optimal one. Prices are influenced by a lot of other factors. Especially in the
transition economies, prices were heavily distorted in the beginning of the transition as a
heritage of the central planning system. Some countries, like Estonia and Lithuania,
have established and maintained a peg to Western currencies, but many other countries
experienced hyperinflation and serious exchange rate fluctuations or devaluations. Thus,
prices may be a rather poor indicator.
It would be preferable to measure the growth of manufacturing directly. Unfortu-
nately, these data are not available for all countries. Data on the average annual growth
of manufacturing are available for only 11 countries. Running a regression with only 11
observations does not appear very promising, but I will do so anyway.
If the Dutch disease hypothesis hold, one would expect that in natural resource abun-
dant countries, the manufacturing sector grows slower than the other sectors. There
should be a lag between the growth of GDP as a whole and the growth of the manufac-
turing sector.
In order to test for this possibility, I have calculated a variable ManLag (Manufac-
turing Lag), which is defined as the difference between the average annual growth of
GDP in percent and the growth of the manufacturing sector.
FIGURE 5.5
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There are only ten countries for which both ShaPrimEx and ManLag are available.
These ten countries are plotted in Figure 5.5:
If there is a relationship between ShaPrimEx and ManLag, it appears to be non-
linear. I run a regression of ManLag on ShaPrimEx and ShaPrimEx². The results are
shown in table 5.12:
TABLE 5.12
Natural Resource Abundance and the Manufacturing Lag
Dependent variable ManLag





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -11,6992949 5,72241625 -2,04446765 0,08018245
ShaPrimEx 85,0533211 31,0224852 2,74166691 0,02884870
ShaPrimEx² -105,412922 35,7765816 -2,94642242 0,02151595
Although I have only ten observations, I find a significant relationship between natu-
ral resource abundance and the manufacturing gap. The relationship is non-linear: At
low levels of ShaPrimEx, it is highly positive; it levels off as ShaPrimEx rises.
The effect of ShaPrimEx on ManLag is positive until ShaPrimEx reaches a value of
0.806. Only one country, Azerbaijan, exceeds this value slightly, and all other countries
are far below it. Thus, the overall effect of ShaPrimEx on ManLag in the relevant range
of ShaPrimEx is clearly positive.
This finding provides evidence for the claim that natural resource abundance indeed
impedes the growth of the manufacturing sector, probably via Dutch disease effects.
While it seems natural that in countries that are richly endowed with natural re-
sources the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP should be small, it does not auto-
matically follow that the growth of the manufacturing sector should be lower than that
of GDP. The fact that in natural resource abundant countries the manufacturing sector
grows slower compared to the rest of the economy strongly indicates that the Dutch dis-
ease is at work.
The effect of the Dutch disease symptoms on growth is difficult to quantify. There is
obviously the direct effect of slowing down the growth of the manufacturing sector,
which is part of the economy.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 57
Sachs and Warner (2001) calculate the contribution of manufacturing exports to
overall growth, by multiplying the growth in value added from manufacturing exports
with the share of manufacturing exports in GDP. For this contribution to GDP growth,
they find a negative association with natural resource abundance, so they can conclude
that in developing countries, there was an effect of natural resources on growth via re-
duced competitiveness.
However, the lower growth of the manufacturing sector does not explain lower over-
all growth by itself. If the only effect were the reduced competitiveness in manufactur-
ing, good old Ricardian logic would imply that a country would specialise in the goods
where it has a comparative advantage: natural resources. The shift from manufacturing
to the primary sector would be economically efficient and it would in fact raise welfare.
The reason why a specialisation in natural resources, mirrored by a decline of the
manufacturing sector, may be undesirable is that manufacturing may exhibit positive
externalities.
Sachs and Warner (2001) argue that the manufacturing sector may be characterised
by learning-by-doing effects. In contrast, natural resource extraction is usually per-
formed by more or less unskilled workers. In many cases, the capital equipment that is
used in the extraction process is imported from foreign producers. In such cases, there
are no learning effects from natural resource extraction.
If learning-by-doing occurs in manufacturing more than in other sectors, then manu-
facturing exhibits a positive externality on the other sectors of the economy, by speeding
up technological progress. However, since technological progress is not easily observed,
I cannot verify this hypothesis empirically.
I conclude this sub-section with the observation that Dutch disease effects can be ob-
served in the transition economies, but the size of these effects is not yet known.
I have shown that natural resources tend to increase the relative price level of a
country. There is no negative relationship between relative price levels and growth, but
this does not disqualify the Dutch disease hypothesis because causality can run both
ways here, and prices could be distorted by other factors.
In natural resource abundant countries, the manufacturing sector tends to grow rela-
tively slowly, compared to the rest of the economy. If it is true that manufacturing ex-
hibits positive externalities in the form of technological progress through learning-by-
doing, the indirect effects on growth may be considerably larger than the direct effect of
slow growth in manufacturing.
It would be interesting to perform a growth accounting analysis here. Specifically, if
there is learning-doing in manufacturing, one should find that total factor productivity
(TFP) grows slowly in countries where the manufacturing sector grows slowly. Natural
resource abundance would then be associated with low TFP growth, and this might ex-
plain a large part of the variation in growth. For this growth accounting analysis, one
would need data on the growth of the labour force and the (physical and human) capital
stock.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 58
5.3 Neglect of Investment in Human Capital
Gylfason (2001) finds that among developing countries, neglect of investment in human
capital is one of the prime reasons that explain the curse of natural resources. In fact, the
impact of neglecting education is so strong that “of the total effect of natural capital on
growth, almost half can [...] be attributed to education...”.
In traditional growth models, neither the rate of investment in capital nor the stock of
capital influences long-run economic growth. This holds for human capital just as it
does for physical capital. There are three reasons why I suspect that investment in hu-
man capital could have had an impact on growth in the transition economies:
Firstly, one decade is probably not what most growth theories mean when they are
concerned with the “long run”. And in the short run, a rise in the savings rate does speed
up growth because the economy moves toward a new (higher) steady state.
Second, the notion that the savings rate does not influence growth only holds if the
economy is in a steady state. The transition economies were definitely not in a steady
state after 1989. They may have come from a steady state, but during the 1990s they
were in transition towards a new steady state.
Third, endogenous growth theory has shown that if technological progress is deter-
mined endogenously, investment in human capital may very well have an impact on
long-run growth. Different models and different assumptions lead to different results,
but in many cases the stock, or the growth of the stock, of human capital determines
growth.
One might argue that, since the transition economies are not at the technological
frontier, technological progress is exogenous to them. But even in that case, they may
need human capital in order to understand and apply the knowledge that spills over from
abroad.
In the first step, I examine the relationship between natural resource abundance and
gross secondary school enrolment in 1990.
It is common practice in studies on economic growth to use a measure of school en-
rolment (primary, secondary, or tertiary) at the start of the time period considered. The
reason is that initial enrolment rates indicate the initial level of human capital. Follow-
ing this tradition, I examine the relationship between gross secondary enrolment in 1990
and average annual growth of GDP per capita. Ideally, I would have used data from
1989, but they were not available for all countries.
A quick glance at Figure 5.5 does not reveal any obvious relationship between the
share of primary goods in exports and secondary enrolment rates. I use enrolment data
from 1990 because it is widely available and should give an approximation of the level
of human capital in an economy at the beginning of the transition. Data from 1989
would be preferable, but is not available for several countries. Over the whole range of
the country sample, with ShaPrimEx varying between twelve percent and eighty-seven
percent, there is no trend in gross secondary enrolment.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 59
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However, it is still worth verifying such a hypothesis. Therefore, I first run a regres-
sion on secondary enrolment rates in 1990 to see whether natural resource abundant
countries really neglected education. Table 5.13 shows the results:
TABLE 5.13
Natural Resource Abundance and Secondary Enrolment 1990
Dependent variable SecEnrol90





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 83,8727567 4,66993613 17,9601507 6,1163E-13
ShaPrimEx 7,08796376 11,4249736 0,62039213 0,54277538
There may be a rather weak relationship between natural resource abundance and
secondary enrolment rates in 1990.
I have also tried different specifications, but the result does not change. R²-adjusted is
always negative, and there is no evidence for a relationship between ShaPrimEx and
SecEnrol90.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 60
Why is there no relationship between gross secondary enrolment and natural resource
abundance in the transition economies?
In developing countries, the relationship is significant and quite strong. Gylfason
(2001) finds that “an increase in the natural capital share by five percentage points goes
along with a decrease by 10 percentage points in the secondary school enrolment rate...”
If this relationship would hold in the transition economies, with their enormous differ-
ences in natural resource abundance, I should find huge variations in secondary enrol-
ment rates.
One reason may be that prior to 1989, investment in education was not based on
market incentives, but on ideological ones. The neglect of human capital investment in
natural resource abundant countries is usually explained by a crowding-out effect of the
primary goods industries: If unskilled workers can earn a reasonable wage in the pri-
mary goods sector, they have little incentive to invest in education. High wages in the
primary sector crowd out investment in human capital. This influences the decisions of
individuals as well as the government: Individuals consider the alternative between
working at a reasonable wage and going through long years of unpaid and unpleasant
education. Limited access to schooling especially in the countryside might also require
moving to another city.
The government in turn has little incentive to invest heavily in education as long as
the economy can live off the primary goods sector fairly enough. There may even be
lobbying from the natural resource industry against education programmes because they
may prefer cheap unskilled workers to expensive skilled ones.
In the centrally planned economies, things were different: There was no crowding out
of investment in human capital because of the distorted prices. Schooling was essen-
tially free and widely available. Therefore, individuals went to school happily.
Governments were massively subsidising education due to ideological reasons. In an
idealistic view, one may argue that there was still the socialist ideal of a classless soci-
ety. Necessary for the classless society was obviously an equally educated workforce.
Differences in the access to education would again increase social differences and lead
to class-building.
In a more pragmatic view, Soviet leaders stressed the need for education in their
quest for technological supremacy over the West. Even in the 1980s, when the commu-
nist countries had fallen far behind in terms of living standards and economic develop-
ment, they were still renowned for considerable scientific achievements, like building
the first permanently manned space station Mir. The basis for the communist countries’
strength in science was their heavy investment in education.
Therefore, secondary enrolment rates in most communist countries were close to the
maximum of one hundred, and the data for 1990 still reflect this.
If the above reasoning is true, it follows that the transition to a market economy
should lead to the same problems encountered in many developing countries. In natural
resource abundant countries, both governments and individuals would neglect invest-
ment in human capital, and enrolment rates would fall.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 61
Figure 5.6 plots the share of primary goods in exports against gross secondary enrol-
ment rates. There seems to be a slightly negative relation between these two variables.
FIGURE 5.7
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In order to test whether this perceived relationship is significant, I run a regression on
secondary enrolment rates in 1995 (SenEnrol95) with ShaPrimEx as explanatory variable.
TABLE 5.14
Natural Resource Abundance and Secondary Enrolment Rates 1995
Dependent variable SecEnrol95





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 89,0902231 6,306731516 14,12621147 3,50359E-11
ShaPrimEx -16,16658969 15,42938472 -1,047779284 0,308606506
Table 5.14 shows the result of this test. In contrast to table 5.13, there is now a nega-
tive association between natural resource abundance and gross secondary enrolment. R²-
adjusted is now positive, but still very small. Unfortunately, the relationship betweenOsteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 62
ShaPrimEx and SecEnrol95 is statistically very weak. With a p-value of 30.9 percent,
the negative relationship could still result from sheer coincidence.
In order to improve the regression , I try out a non-linear specification. Table 5.15
shows that the inclusion of ShaPrimEx² improves the fit of the regression.
TABLE 5.15
Natural Resource Abundance and Secondary Enrolment Rates 1995 II
Dependent variable SecEnrol95





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 105,1931191 12,67534199 8,299035972 2,20668E-07
ShaPrimEx -111,505998 67,39870274 -1,65442351 0,116385388
ShaPrimEx² 103,0568745 71,03302149 1,450830506 0,165029281
ShaPrimEx, with a p-value of 11.7 percent, is now almost significant at a ten percent
error level. ShaPrimEx² is less significant, with a p-value of 16.5 percent.
To test whether this development has continued it would be ideal to run a further re-
gression with enrolment data from more recent years. Unfortunately, the most recent
data I could find for a sufficient number of countries is from 1997, and it is not available
for Russia, the largest of the transition economies.
Table 5.16 shows that in 1997, the relationship between natural resource abundance
and secondary enrolment rates had become even stronger than in 1995. R²-adjusted is
higher than in the regression for 1995, and both explanatory variables have increased in
size and significance.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 63
TABLE 5.16
Natural Resource Abundance and Secondary Enrolment Rates 1997
Dependent variable SecEnrol97





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 107,742145 13,2851787 8,10995072 4,6433E-07
ShaPrimEx -121,859156 71,3415237 -1,70810981 0,10694078
ShaPrimEx² 111,130092 74,2285735 1,49713361 0,15382496
This might indicate that the negative relationship between natural resource abun-
dance and secondary enrolment, which emerged during the first half of the 1990s,
strengthened further from 1995 to 1997. If this trend continues, it is quite plausible that
natural resource abundance, via lowering enrolment rates, will reduce growth in the fu-
ture.
I now try something different: Instead of relating secondary enrolment rates to natural
resource abundance, I look at the change in percentage terms in secondary enrolments
from 1990 to 1995. I have calculated the arithmetic mean of the total change, so that I
compare the average annual change in percentage terms.
FIGURE 5.8
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Figure 5.7 plots the share of primary goods in exports against the change in secon-
dary enrolment rates. I have calculated this indicator by dividing the change in percent-
age points from 1990 to 1995 by the number of years (usually five; in some cases two or
three because data were not available for 1990 and 1995).
There appears to be a negative correlation between natural resource abundance and
the change in secondary enrolment rates.
TABLE 5.17
Natural Resource Abundance and the Change in Secondary Enrolment Rates
Dependent variable SecEnrolChng





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 4,264613895 2,316632847 1,840867404 0,083162510
ShaPrimEx -24,08099180 12,31825135 -1,954903430 0,067241389
ShaPrimEx² 20,61066025 12,98248449 1,587574417 0,130806711
Table 5.17 shows the result of the accompanying regression: The coefficient of Sha-
PrimEx is negative and relatively significant, with a p-value of 6.7 percent. ShaPrimEx²
is less significant, but excluding it would reduce the significance of ShaPrimEx, so I
decided to retain it.
I conclude from these observations that natural resource abundance has the expected
effect of decreasing investment in human capital, measured as enrolment in secondary
education.
The reason for the non-correlation between natural resource abundance and secon-
dary enrolment in 1990 is the absence of market forces under the communist regimes.
Since then, markets forces have emerged, and the abundance of natural resources makes
investment in human capital less attractive, for governments as well as individuals. The
relation between natural resource abundance and secondary enrolment rates was not yet
very pronounced in 1995 because all countries started off at similar levels of enrolment.
However, there is some evidence that since 1990, secondary enrolment rates  in natural
resource abundant countries have dropped, while in natural resource poor countries they
have risen. If this development continues, one can expect to find a significant correla-
tion between natural resource abundance and secondary enrolment rates in the near fu-
ture.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 65
The second step in the test for the education channel is to examine whether low in-
vestment in human capital can be shown to have a negative impact on growth.
FIGURE 5.9
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Figure 5.8 shows that graphically, there appears to be no significant relationship be-
tween these two variables.
In order to verify this, I first run a simple regression of average annual growth of real
GDP per capita on gross secondary enrolment rates in 1990. Table 5.18 shows the re-
sult:
TABLE 5.18
Secondary Enrolment Rates 1990 and Growth
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Coefficient t-statistic p-value
Intercept 4,21345966 6,45894366 0,65234501 0,52093705
SecEnrol90 -0,09223143 0,07274456 -1,26788086 0,21809536Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 66
Thus, there is no significant relation between SecEnrol90 and average growth of real
GDP per capita. There is even some hint of a negative relation between these two vari-
ables. I have checked for the robustness of the result by trying different specifications
with the natural logarithm and the square of SenEnrol90, and the results were similar:
No evidence for a positive impact of initial enrolment rates on growth.
TABLE 5.19
Secondary Enrolment Rates 1990, other explanatory variables, and Growth
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -2,78786582 4,79498197 -0,58141320 0,56959666
ShaPrimEx -12,0012450 1,56282490 -7,67920002 1,4202E-06
LOG(RGDPpC89) 1,56833555 1,09504479 1,43221133 0,17259248
InterAction 0,41684142 0,11393726 3,65851712 0,00232884
SecEnrol90 -0,02725349 0,02967309 -0,91845811 0,37291235
Table 5.19 shows that the result persists when I introduce some powerful explanatory
variables. ShaPrimEx, LOG(RGDPpC89), and InterAction are similarly significant as in
Section 4, and SenEnrol90 is insignificant.
This result is of course no surprise because SecEnrol90 was one of the first variables
I excluded in Section 4 precisely because of its weak significance.
However, by now I can explain why SecEnrol90 is rather insignificant in explaining
growth during the 1990s: There are two possibilities:
Differences in the initial stock of human capital cannot explain the variation in
growth simply because there were (almost) no differences in initial human capital. Most
countries started at secondary enrolment rates between 80 and 100 percent in 1990, and
no country except Macedonia (which was not a country at that time) was far from this
range. In statistical terms, the leverage of the variable SenEnrol90 is small. If this is the
case, it becomes difficult to reveal the true relationship with OLS methods. If the sample
contained some countries with remarkably lower values of SecEnrol90, I might find the
positive relationship between SecEnrol90 and AvGroRGDPpC that I expected to find.
Another possibility is that since all countries are close to the highest possible enrol-
ment rate, they are in the range where investment in education runs into decreasing re-
turns, and that therefore no positive relationship can be found.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 67
I have shown above that in 1990, natural resource abundance and secondary enrol-
ment rates were not correlated, but during the 1990s a (somewhat weak) negative cor-
relation arises. Natural resource abundance is negatively correlated with the change in
secondary enrolment rates.
Therefore, I find it worthwhile to examine whether I can find a correlation between
the change in secondary enrolment and growth during the 1990s.
TABLE 5.20
The Change in Secondary Enrolment and Growth
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -3,36113894 0,77388163 -4,34322099 0,00028596
SecEnrolChng 0,62284577 0,26395885 2,35963205 0,02805117
Table 5.20 shows the results of a regression of AvGroRGDPpC on SecEnrolChng,
the average annual change in the gross secondary enrolment rate. Apparently, there is a
positive correlation here. Adjusted R² is rather low, but SecEnrolChng is significant at a
five percent error level. The coefficient on SecEnrolChng means that if a country de-
creased its gross secondary enrolment rate by one percent each year, it slowed down
growth by 0.6 percent.
The result from table 5.20 should be judged with caution. First of all, the causality is
not clear. It may have been the case that those countries that were in economic turmoil
anyway had to decrease their efforts on schooling. This would mean that slow growth
led to low enrolment, and not the other way around. If people are credit-constrained
(which certainly was the case in the transition countries with their weak banking sector),
it makes sense that if output drops dramatically, parents can no longer afford to finance
their children’s education.
Furthermore, the effect of investment in human capital on growth usually comes with
a large time lag. If secondary enrolment increases in year zero, the effect on growth will
materialise only in a few years from now, when today’s students finish school and enter
the labour market. It takes even more time until those who entered secondary education
after year zero make up a large share of the labour force.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 68
Keeping all these problems in mind, I nevertheless try to estimate the size of the ef-
fect of natural resource abundance through the education channel. I first run a regression
of AvGroRGDPpC on ShaPrimEx and SecEnrolChng to find the direct effects of the
two variables on growth. Table 5.21 shows the results:
TABLE 5.21
The Effects of Natural Resource Abundance andthe Change in Secondary Enrol-
ment Rates on Growth
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 1,08852693 0,75013044 1,45111686 0,16495056
ShaPrimEx -11,6655291 1,94376467 -6,00151312 1,4297E-05
SecEnrolChng 0,05081938 0,14847327 0,34227967 0,73633568
Once again, a problem of serious multicollinearity arises: The presence of Sha-
PrimEx obscures the effects of SecEnrolChng on growth, so SecEnrolChng becomes
completely insignificant. This means that the coefficient on SecEnrolChng cannot be
estimated with sufficient precision.
As I did in Section 5.1 in the case of SCI, I therefore try to find an estimate for an in-
strumental variable of SecEnrolChng.
Table 5.22 shows the result of a stepwise regression on SecEnrolChng. ShaPrimEx is
not very significant, but excluding it reduces adjusted R² considerably, so I decided to









Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept -4,75062618 2,26605003 -2,09643482 0,05229534
CapForm 0,21930814 0,08171721 2,68374469 0,01630559
PopGro8999 -2,23764270 0,92444031 -2,42053779 0,02775975
ShaPrimEx -3,60628379 2,39932508 -1,50304093 0,15230867
All the coefficient have a plausible sign. The positive coefficient on CapForm means
that countries that invest a lot in capital goods tend to invest in secondary education at
the same time. The negative coefficient on PopGro8999 means that countries with high
population in general did not invest sufficiently in new schools to maintain their enrol-
ment ratios. Finally, the negative coefficient on ShaPrimEx means that in natural re-
source abundant countries enrolment rates declined in general.
TABLE 5.23
The Effects of SecEnrolChng* and ShaPrimEx on Growth
Dependent variable AvGroRGDPpC





Coefficient Standard error t-statistic p-value
Intercept 1,09905622 0,77593977 1,41641950 0,17471607
ShaPrimEx -11,7160537 2,15399419 -5,43922252 4,4186E-05
SecEnrolChng* 0,04074235 0,23591674 0,17269800 0,86492823Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 70
Using the estimates from the regression on SecEnrolChng I compute the instrumental
variable SenEnrolChng*:
SecEnrolChng* = - 4.7506 + 0.2193 CapForm – 2.2376 PopGro – 3.6063 ShaPrimEx
Then, I run the appropriate regression on AvGroRGPpC, with ShaPrimEx and Se-
cEnrolChng* as explanatory variables. Table 5.23 shows the results:
Unfortunately, this does not solve the problem: SecEnrolChng is still very insignifi-
cant. Thus, I cannot use the coefficient estimate as a reliable estimate of the true effect.
To sum up, the effect of educational effort on growth in the transition economies re-
mains rather vague. The data show that all countries started their transition with similar
levels of secondary enrolment. I have shown that there was a tendency for natural re-
source abundant countries to neglect education: In those countries, secondary enrolment
rates generally declined. In other countries, they increased.
There is little evidence for an effect of this difference in educational effort on growth.
The reason could be that in the mid-nineties, for which I have data, the differences in
enrolment rates were not yet sufficiently large to have an impact on growth. However,
one can reasonably assume that in the future this might change. If enrolment rates keep
falling in the natural resource abundant countries, this will probably have a negative
effect on their growth rates in the future.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 71
6 Conclusion
6.1 The Curse Exists
There can be little doubt that among the group of transition economies in this paper,
natural resource abundance is associated with slow economic growth. The evidence is
surprisingly strong: Those countries that are relatively abundant in natural resources
performed very poorly in terms of economic growth. The countries that are less abun-
dant in natural resources recovered from the shock of transition much more quickly and
returned to “normal” (positive) growth rates after three or less years of transition.
Among the CEE-5 countries, which outperformed all other transition economies,
Poland has the highest share of primary goods in total exports: 21 percent in 1999. None
of the CEE-5 is natural resource abundant.
The countries that rank highest in terms of natural resource abundance are “growth
disasters”: Russia, with a primary export share of 57 percent, suffered negative GDP
growth rates from 1990 to 1998. Moldova, with a primary export share of 73 percent,
had negative growth rates throughout the last decade of the 20
th century.
These observations, eye-catching as they are, are no exceptions: Multiple regressions
including a wide range of other explanatory variables show that natural resource abun-
dance is statistically negatively correlated with economic growth. According to my
findings, natural resource abundance is one of the most powerful variables in explaining
economic growth in the transition economies.
The effect of the curse of natural resources is quite sizeable: A country with a pri-
mary export share that is 10 percentage points higher than in an otherwise similar coun-
try is estimated to grow by one percent slower than the latter country.
Aside from natural resource abundance, there are two other important explanatory
variables: Real GDP per capita in 1989 and the growth of exports.
Real GDP per capita in 1989 is positively correlated with growth in the 1990s. This
may seem surprising, because usually, initial income is negatively correlated with sub-
sequent growth, indicating conditional convergence. Among the transition economies
there appears to be no conditional convergence.
The level of GDP per capita in 1989 can be interpreted as a proxy for the general de-
velopment level of an economy. Economies that were relatively well developed may
have been in a better position to deal with the problems of transition than less developed
economies. This may explain why relatively advanced economies, such as the CEE-5,
managed to recover quickly. The less advanced economies, especially the outlying re-
gions of the former Soviet Union, were less adaptive. This theory explains why initial
GDP per capita is positively correlated with subsequent growth.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 72
The effect of export growth on GDP growth is more complicated. Export growth it-
self is positively correlated with economic growth, but the effect may not be symmetric
in all countries. The interaction term I have used indicates that the effect of export
growth on output growth may be stronger in natural resource abundant countries than in
other countries.
These three variables, natural resource abundance, initial GDP per capita, and export
growth, together explain more than 80 percent of the variation in growth rates among
the transition economies. This is an impressive result.
Figure 6.1 shows how powerful a model with these three variables is in explaining
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The model prediction error is the difference between the growth rate that the model
predicts when one enters the variables for each country and the actual growth rate.
For 13 out of the 20 countries for which the necessary data are available, the model
prediction error is less than one percent. Only for two countries, Poland and Lithuania,
the model prediction differs more than two percent from the actual value.
For Poland, the model would predict an average growth rate of –1.2 percent. In real-
ity, Poland achieved an average growth rate of 1.8 percent. Thus, the model prediction
error is three percent. Poland performed extremely well, considering its natural resource
endowment, which is the highest among the CEE-5, and its initial GDP per capita,
which was lowest among the CEE-5. There must be some factor that raised Poland’sThe curse of natural resources in the transition economies 73
growth rate above what could be expected; maybe the extremely successful mass priva-
tisation programme helped a lot.
To sum up, natural resource abundance had a very significant negative impact on
economic growth in the transition economies. In fact, it appears to be the most important
factor. Other important factors are the initial level of GDP per capita and export growth.
However, the example of Poland shows that the natural resource endowment of a
country does not determine the fate of an economy. It appears that through sound eco-
nomic policy, Poland managed to overcome the curse of natural resources. This pro-
vides some optimism, because other countries may learn from the Polish example.
6.2 Corruption Is The Main Reason For The Curse
The reasons for the curse of natural resources have been summarised in Section 2. In the
world of the transition economies, corruption seems to be the main driving force behind
the curse: A state capture index, which measures the extent of corruption in the state
bureaucracy, is closely correlated with natural resource abundance. This observation
supports the theoretical argument that natural resource abundance tends to foster cor-
ruption.
In Section 5.1 I have shown that there is a strong negative correlation between eco-
nomic growth and the extent of corruption in a country. This finding completes the
chain of causality: Natural resources abundance leads to corruption, and corruption
leads to slow economic growth.
Of course, the relationship is not perfect. Corruption is not caused solely by natural
resources. The heritage of the former communist regimes certainly also plays a role. The
various approaches to privatisation also influenced the extent of corruption: The Czech
mass privatisation programme gave rise to massive corruption, and this may explain
why the Czech Republic performed worse than the other CEE-5 countries.
The size of the effect is difficult to estimate because in order to do so, one needs to
run a regression on growth with natural resource abundance and corruption as explana-
tory variables to discern the direct and indirect effects of natural resource abundance.
Doing so leads to problems of multicollinearity, precisely because of the close correla-
tion of natural resource abundance and corruption. The coefficient estimate of the cor-
ruption index then becomes very inaccurate.
Using an instrumental variable instead of the corruption index itself partly solves this
problem. In Section 5.1, I find that almost half of the total curse of natural resources can
be explained by corruption.
Dutch disease effects may also play a role in the transition economies, but the evi-
dence is mixed. Controlling for GDP per capita, I find a non-linear, but positive, effect
of natural resource abundance on the relative price level of a country. The reason is that
revenues from primary exports are spent domestically on non-tradable goods; this raises
the price level in general.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 74
According to theory, this relatively high price level should impose a drag on growth
because it makes producers of manufactured goods incompetitive on the world market. I
do not find a significant relationship between relative price levels and economic growth,
but I do find that in natural resource abundant countries the manufacturing sector as a
whole has grown relatively slowly.
The relationship between growth in manufacturing and GDP growth is not entirely
clear. In order to find out whether there are positive externalities to manufacturing (for
example in the form of learning-by-doing technological progress), one would have to
analyse total factor productivity growth. One might expect to find a positive relationship
between manufacturing and TFP growth. Further research into this direction may prove
fruitful.
Neglect of investment in human capital, which accounts for a large part of the total
curse of natural resources in developing countries, seems to have had little impact on the
transition economies.
The reason is probably the time lag associated with education. There is some evi-
dence for the claim that natural resource abundant countries have tended to neglect edu-
cation: Secondary enrolment rates in these countries are falling (see Figure 5.8). How-
ever, most transition countries started in 1990 at similar rates of secondary enrolment as
a heritage of the communist system, which emphasised the role of education. The ne-
glect of education may lead to differences in secondary enrolment rates, but by 1997, the
effect was not yet very pronounced.
Nevertheless, in Table 5.20 I find a positive relationship between the change in sec-
ondary enrolment rates and economic growth. However, the direction of causality is not
clear: It may be that educational effort increased growth, but it may be as well that slow
economic growth forced governments to cut back on educational spending.
There is almost no evidence for an impact of educational effort on economic growth.
This is not surprising: If countries do not (yet) differ significantly in terms of enrolment
rates, different enrolment rates cannot be an explanation for different growth rates.
However, there is reason to assume that over time, the neglect of education will have an
impact on growth.
If more recent data on education effort become available, further research may lead to
stronger results: If the trend of neglecting education in natural resource abundant coun-
tries continues, this will finally result in different enrolment rates. And these differences
in turn may have an impact on growth. If more data become available, one might find
better results using panel data. Finally, one might also consider using alternative meas-
ures of educational effort, such as the number of teachers per student, or the percentage
of the government budget spent on education. A more extensive study could treat these
issues.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 75
6.3 Advice For Policy-Makers
The ultimate goal of economic research is to provide policy-makers with advice how to
improve the economic performance, and thus raise living standards of the population.
What can policy-makers in the transition countries learn from this paper? That natu-
ral resources are bad for growth? Should they set oilfields on fire and demolish the gold
mines?
The answer is of course: No. As Gylfason (2001) puts it: “it is not the existence of
natural wealth as such that seems to be the problem, but rather the failure of public
authorities to avert the dangers that accompany the gifts of nature. Good policies can
turn abundant natural resource riches into an unambiguous blessing.”
So what can be done to overcome the curse of natural resources? The most obvious
solution is easier said than done: Fight corruption.
The data show that countries where corruption is widespread and common perform
poorly in terms of economic growth. In Section 2.6 I point out why corruption is bad for
growth. According to my estimates, corruption may explain up to one half of the total
curse of natural resources. Thus, the benefits from reducing corruption would be tre-
mendous.
Of course, corruption is not easily rooted out by sheer willpower. Something needs to
be done against corruption, and policy-makers should definitely put more emphasis on
the fight against corruption. If corruption cannot be rooted out completely, a more cen-
tralised state structure may be a good idea. Centralisation by itself does not reduce cor-
ruption, but in a centralised bureaucracy, corruption may have less distortionary effects
than in a decentralised system (Bardhan, 1997).
The positive effect of export growth on GDP growth also provides a useful hint:
Policies that aim at increasing exports may have additional benefits. Most countries al-
ready pursue export-oriented economic policies. Membership in the EU may provide
additional export growth. One might consider an industrial policy that targets especially
the export-oriented manufacturing sector.
Another point is that education should not be neglected. The gains from education
will accrue to the population with a time lag of more than a decade, which is why they
are so often neglected by today’s policy-makers, but they are huge.
I believe that Norway provides a shining example of how to deal with extraordinary
natural resource endowments: In Norway, almost 90 percent of oil revenues are col-
lected by the state. These revenues are then invested in infrastructure, education, and to
a large share in foreign pension funds. This way, the Dutch disease effects are mitigated
because only part of the oil revenues are spent in Norway itself. Furthermore, the bene-
fits from oil extraction are spread evenly among the whole population and even over
time.
Of course, in order to follow the Norwegian example, one needs a strong, efficient
bureaucracy. Otherwise, the oil revenues may again vanish in black holes somewhere in
the state bureaucracy. This again strengthens the point to fight corruption.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 76
There is no need to become desperate. Governments of natural resource abundant
countries, if they want to raise national welfare, should announce credible actions
against corruption and take swift action. They should set up proper tax systems and in-
stitutions that enforce the payment of taxes. If corruption is credibly fought, the reve-
nues from natural resource exports may be used as in the Norwegian model. Thus, the
main priority of these governments should be to find ways to reduce the extent of cor-
ruption within their state bureaucracy.The curse of natural resources in the transition economies 77
Appendix A: Data Sources
Average annual growth of exports, 1994 – 1999 (ExGro9499)
Source: Calculated from export data from the Economic Survey of Europe. Ideally, I
would have used export growth over the whole period 1989-1999, but export figures are
not available for most countries before 1994. Especially for the former Soviet union
member states, which became independent just in 1991, export figures before 1994 are
not available.
Average annual growth of the manufacturing sector
Source World Bank (www.worldbank.org). I have used this variable to calculate the
manufacturing lag, the difference between the growth of the economy as a whole and the
manufacturing sector.
Average annual growth of real GDP per capita (AvGroRGDPpC):
Source: own calculations using the growth of real GDP and the population.
Average annual growth of real GDP 1980 – 1989 (Growth8089):
Source: calculated from real GDP estimates taken from the Economic Survey of Europe
published by the United Nations.
Average annual growth of the population 1989 – 1999 (PopGro8999):
Source: calculated from population figures taken from the International Data Base of the
U.S. Census Bureau (http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html)
Gross capital formation as percentage of GDP(CapForm):
Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.org). Gross capital formation is roughly the same
as gross domestic investment. Annual data are available for most countries from 1995
on. My variable CapForm is actually the average between 1995 and 1999, so it does not
reflect any upward or downward trends within a country. It merely reflects differences
among countries.
Exports in US dollars:
Source: Economic Survey of Europe. I have used these data to calculate the share of
exports in GDP.
GDP in billions of US dollars (1998):
Source: World Economic Outlook database.Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 78
Manufacturing Lag (ManLag)
Source: Calculated by taking the difference between the growth of the manufacturing
sector and GDP growth.
Real GDP 1989 – 1999 (index):
Source: Economic Survey of Europe
Real GDP per capita in 1989 in billions of US dollars (RGDPpC89):
Source: calculated using GDP per capita 1998 in billions of US dollars at PPP, growth
of real GDP, and population. I have used 1998 as base year because for this year data
were available for all countries. I preferred using PPP rates for conversion because mar-
ket exchange rates behaved very erratically during the 1990s in the transition econo-
mies. For example, Bulgaria’s GDP fell from 47 billion dollars in 1989 to 8 billion dol-
lars in 1991, valued at market exchange rates.
RGDPpC89 is thus valued at 1998 prices and purchasing power parity. This should
result in a measure which roughly reflects the actual development level of the economy.
Relative price level (RelPrice):
Source: calculated by dividing GNP in US dollars at market exchange rates by GNP in
US dollars at purchasing power parity rates. Both GNP figures were taken from Globale
Trends 2002.
Secondary enrolment rate (Gross, 1990, 1995, 1997)
Source: UNESCO online database (www.uis.unesco.org). Gross secondary enrolment is
one of the most common measures of educational effort. However, as I point out in the
text, other measures could also be used.
Share of exports in GDP:
Source: calculated by dividing exports in US dollars by GDP in US dollars. All data are
from 1999 except for Croatia, Czech Republic, Macedonia, Slovak Republic, and Slo-
venia (1998). I have used this variable to calculate the share of primary exports in GDP.
Share of primary goods in exports (ShaPrimEx):
Source: World Bank (www.worldbank.org). The share of primary goods (food, agricul-
tural raw materials, fuels, ores and metals) in exports.
Share of primary exports in GDP (ShaPrimGDP):
Source: Calculated by multiplying ShaPrimEx with the share of exports in GDPThe curse of natural resources in the transition economies 79
State capture index (SCI)
Source: Business Environment and Performance Survey. This survey was sponsored by
the World Bank and aimed specifically at the transition economies. The index reflects to
what extent the decisions of the different bodies of the government have to be “pur-
chased” by the companies; in other words, how many bribes they have to pay.
Although there are various corruption indexes, I have decided to use this specific one
because it is available for all transition economies, and the accompanying study aimed
precisely at these countries. The close correlation between this index and economic
growth supports the credibility of the index.
Trade liberalisation index (TradLib):
Source: Transition Report 1999, EBRD. This is an index incorporating various meas-
ures of trade liberalisation, such as import barriers and currency convertibility. The in-
dex ranges from “1” (high barriers to trade) to “4+” (almost complete liberalisation). For
the regression analyses, I have transformed the “4+” into a “5”. Otherwise, the computer























Short name AvGroRGDPpC AvGroRGDP ShaPrimEx ShaPrimGDP RGDPpC89 TradLib
Albania -1,18 -0,49 0,33 0,019 1.390,44 4
Armenia -5,03 -4,93 0,34 0,040 971,81 4
Azerbaijan -8,09 -7,31 0,86 0,210 1.322,52 3
Belarus -2,23 -2,04 0,20 0,112 1.781,61 1
Bulgaria -2,14 -3,41 0,33 0,106 1.978,42 5
Croatia -1,91 -2,47 0,25 0,049 6.187,27 4
Czech Rep. -0,45 -0,48 0,12 0,057 5.728,24 5
Estonia -1,56 -2,42 0,31 0,171 4.070,00 4
Georgia -10,28 -10,91 N/A N/A 3.263,72 4
Hungary 0,16 -0,06 0,14 0,068 4.816,73 5
Kazakhstan -4,77 -4,67 0,74 0,248 2.170,80 3
Kyrgyzistan -4,73 -4,04 0,40 0,162 620,45 4
Latvia -4,11 -5,04 0,43 0,110 3.995,05 5
Lithuania -4,18 -4,33 0,30 0,082 4.377,94 4
Macedonia -3,30 -2,61 0,28 0,092 2.481,81 4
Moldova -11,11 -10,97 0,73 0,113 1.518,55 4
Poland 1,81 1,99 0,21 0,036 3.686,91 5
Romania -2,56 -2,73 0,21 0,061 2.131,28 4
Russia -5,31 -5,37 0,57 0,274 3.380,00 2
Slovakia -0,12 0,17 0,13 0,065 3.890,13 5
Slovenia 0,35 0,52 0,11 0,047 10.604,61 5
Tajikistan -12,21 -10,47 N/A N/A 632,6 3
Turkmenistan -5,04 -2,97 N/A N/A 682,19 1
Ukraine -8,56 -8,92 N/A N/A 2.098,08 3



















Short name CapForm SCI SecEnrol90 SecEnrol95 SecEnrolChng ExGro9499
Albania 16,1 0,157 78,3 37,5 -8,2 13,774835
Armenia 19,4 0,071 88,3 N/A -4,1 0,549483
Azerbaijan 40,0 0,412 89,9 76,8 -2,6 7,305135
Belarus 25,1 0,080 93,0 93,4 0,1 18,729581
Bulgaria 13,4 0,285 75,2 78,0 0,6 0,121685
Croatia 24,2 0,267 76,2 81,8 1,1 0,051589
Czech Rep. 31,4 0,110 91,2 98,7 1,5 11,068688
Estonia 28,2 0,101 101,9 103,7 0,4 17,621917
Georgia 14,5 0,239 94,9 75,6 -3,9 6,326679
Hungary 28,3 0,068 78,6 97,8 3,8 18,507220
Kazakhstan 16,4 0,125 98,0 84,4 -2,7 11,595335
Kyrgyzistan 20,1 0,293 100,1 78,8 -4,3 5,953519
Latvia 23,5 0,299 82,7 85,0 0,5 11,76496
Lithuania 24,6 0,115 91,9 84,2 -1,5 8,085236
Macedonia 21,7 N/A 55,7 60,9 1,0 1,309628
Moldova 23,9 0,371 80,0 80,9 0,2 -6,166336
Poland 24,7 0,115 81,5 97,6 3,2 9,678655
Romania 21,6 0,211 92,0 77,9 -2,8 6,695405
Russia 19,4 0,316 93,3 N/A -2,1 1,744751
Slovakia 35,4 0,239 88,1 N/A 1,9 8,821474
Slovenia 25,3 0,065 91,1 90,5 -0,1 4,590894
Tajikistan N/A N/A 102,1 80,6 -4,3 6,434110
Turkmenistan 36,9 N/A N/A N/A N/A -11,629741
Ukraine 21,2 0,323 92,8 N/A N/A 2,429655
Uzbekistan 21,6 0,058 99,4 N/A N/A 3,504017Osteuropa-Institut München, Working Papers Nr.241 82
Indicator Average annual
population













Short name PopGro8999 InterAction RelPrice GDPpC98 ManLag
Albania 0,74683003 4,545695583 0,281 1075,394 11,600
Armenia 0,10624727 0,186824437 0,212 494,225 4,800
Azerbaijan 0,85016673 6,28241637 0,189 535,302 N/A
Belarus 0,1930167 3,745916263 0,382 1402,517 -0,400
Bulgaria -1,29799821 0,040156282 0,286 1378,209 N/A
Croatia -0,56284226 0,012897484 0,696 4826,308 5,100
Czech Rep. -0,03236228 1,328242607 0,402 5477,555 N/A
Estonia -0,86527095 5,462794497 N/A 3334,279 N/A
Georgia -0,70170992 N/A 0,243 1003,758 N/A
Hungary -0,21720587 2,591010832 0,424 4719,018 -6,200
Kazakhstan 0,10836276 8,580548033 0,260 1306,980 -5,900
Kyrgyzistan 0,72420467 2,381407775 N/A 357,432 -1,700
Latvia -0,97113599 5,05893275 1,012 2513,732 5,000
Lithuania -0,15805072 2,425570947 1,000 2845,337 6,300
Macedonia 0,72184678 0,366695936 0,359 1600,630 N/A
Moldova 0,16517146 -4,501425295 0,166 499,875 N/A
Poland 0,17964752 2,032517518 0,481 4226,136 N/A
Romania -0,17329106 1,406035149 0,246 1690,259 N/A
Russia -0,06146703 0,994508427 0,322 1882,304 N/A
Slovakia 0,29369895 1,146791579 0,360 3777,142 N/A
Slovenia 0,16954655 0,504998341 0,620 10123,642 -1,400
Tajikistan 1,98393175 N/A N/A 168,912 N/A
Turkmenistan 2,18025365 N/A 0,200 N/A N/A
Ukraine -0,38746275 N/A 0,250 842,539 2,700
Uzbekistan 1,93602023 N/A 0,323 1216,030 N/AThe curse of natural resources in the transition economies 83
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